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SUMMARY
DEFENCE CONVERSION: DEAD DUCK OR STILL A RELEVANT OBJECT OF STUDY? \ MARC VON BOEMCKEN 
The Working Paper charts the evolution of Conversion Studies from the Cold 
War to the post-Cold War period and discusses some of the reasons for the de-
mise of the discipline in the new millennium. Based on a consideration of the 
strengths and weaknesses of Conversion Studies in the past, it makes some 
suggestions on how conversion could inform a systematic field of academic 
inquiry in the 21st century. The propositions put forward to this end lean to-
ward a comparatively conservative approach that pays close attention to the 
historical legacy of conversion as a concept. In sum, Conversion Studies 
should be a multi-disciplinary, critical and policy-relevant field of research 
that advocates social change based on analyses of political economies of vio-
lence, particularly in the affluent, industrialized and comparatively peaceful 
societies of the Global North. At the same time, it ought to abandon its past re-
liance on a simple civil–military dichotomy and, instead, engage with the 
more complex issues raised by a focus on organized violence. This includes a 
continual questioning and readjustment of one’s own normative coordinates. 
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Conversion Studies bridges academic 
cultures
Conversion Studies connects the ‘soft’, overtly 
normative and emancipatory agenda of ‘peace studies’ 
with the ‘hard’, positivist and quantitative approach 
of ‘peace science’. It thus appears as an opportunity 
for both cultures in Peace and Conflict Research to 
communicate with each other, to find common 
grounds and appreciate differences. 
Conversion Studies is both critical and 
policy relevant
Conversion Studies brings criticality and policy 
relevance together—as two principles of research 
that depend upon each other in order to make a real 
change. Conversion Studies ought to be policy relevant 
precisely because it conducts (self-)critical research, 
not despite of it.
Conversion Studies is always also 
Post-Conversion Studies
A Conversion Studies of the 21st century should 
go beyond the reliance of a clear-cut civil-military  
dichotomy. The objective is not to fully overcome or 
eradicate organized violence. Indeed, not every reduc-
tion of organized violence is necessarily desirable. In 
this sense, the normative agenda of conversion needs 
to be continually contested
Conversion Studies pro-actively  
advocates processes of transformation 
bent upon reducing the potentials of 
organized violence for wider social 
benefits      
It makes no sense to speak of conversion without a 
reference to some sort of desired or actual process of 
social transformation. A Conversion Studies of the 21st 
century would have to be an explicitly normative  
science that identifies and proposes reductions in the 
potentials for organized violence against the prevailing 
political Zeitgeist. Importantly, this entails clearly spell-
ing out the expected benefits of any such reduction.
Conversion Studies particularly  
emphasizes the economic conditions of 
organized violence 
Conversion Studies needs to be more than a large 
container for accommodating any normative approach 
to reductions in organization of violence. The aim is 
not to convert hearts and minds and militaristic or 
aggressive attitudes. Instead, Conversion Studies 
ought to be squarely concerned with material resources, 
the political economy of organized violence: with 
capital allocation, manpower, weapons and the  
defence industry. 
Conversion Studies goes beyond an  
exclusive concern with protracted  
violent conflicts and mainly focuses on 
organized violence in ‘peaceful’ regions  
The primary objects of Conversion Studies are 
material manifestations of organized violence in the 
comparatively affluent and highly industrialized  
societies of North America, Europe and East Asia—not 
(or, at least, not only) the violent conflicts of the Global 
South. Increasing investments into organized violence 
in ‘peaceful’ regions present problems of themselves—
and quite regardless of whether they lead to violent 
conflict or not.
Main findings
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Toward the end of the 1990s Michael Brzoska, at 
the time Director of Research at the Bonn Interna-
tional Center for Conversion (BICC), observed in the 
‘Journal for Peace Research’ that “[c]oncepts, like fash-
ions, come and go” (1999a, p. 131). If this is the case, 
then another eighteen years down the line, the con-
cept of conversion appears to be something of an aca-
demic mullet. Between 1972 and 2013, the library cata-
logue of BICC lists a total of 1,415 publications that 
deal with defence conversion as their main subject. 
What seems fairly impressive at first sight gives way 
to a somewhat sobering insight on the second. 88 
percent of this body of texts was published in the 
course of the 1990s. For the more recent period from 
2000 onwards, the catalogue contains a mere 129 en-
tries. Of these, again more than 80 percent cover the 
years 2000 and 2001 alone. Between 2006 and 2013, no 
more than three recorded studies took defence con-
version as their principal object of inquiry. The diag-
nosis could hardly be clearer: Conversion has long 
outlived its heydey, both as an academic concept and 
as an economic or political process. Had the end of 
the Cold War prompted many states to significantly 
reduce their armed forces, certainly since the 9/11 at-
tacks and the still ongoing global ‘war on terror’, the 
overall trend has shifted, once again, to massive rear-
mament in many parts of the world. States, generally 
speaking, are no longer interested in conversion. Why 
should academics be?
This Paper asks whether we, as a scholarly com-
munity that roughly identifies itself with Peace and 
Conflict Research, should let the concept of conver-
sion rest in peace—or whether there might be some-
thing, some aspects to it, worth reviving. To give away 
the answer right at the beginning: It doubts that a 
full-fledged renaissance of ‘old-school’ Conversion 
Studies is an altogether realistic or even desirable ob-
jective. It does, however, argue that a couple of valua-
ble lessons can be learnt by taking a closer look at its 
evolution following World War II, its further develop-
ment and fanning out between the 1960s and 1980s, 
its ‘Golden Age’ in the 1990s and eventual demise in 
the new millennium. 
The by far most publications on the subject ap-
peared in the 1990s as a reaction to political decisions 
to downsize military capacities on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain. BICC’s definition of conversion as ‘the 
operational process of demilitarization and the prac-
tical management of disarmament’ (Laurance et al., 
1995, p. 5) sums up the more general take on the issue 
during this time quite well. Contrary to popular belief, 
however, Conversion Studies was not a child of the 
1990s. Already well beforehand, it described a buzzing, 
diverse and ‘fashionable’ field of academic inquiry 
and critique, firmly established within the overall 
discipline of Peace and Conflict Research. In 1979, for 
example, Ulrich Albrecht published an extensive 
overview of studies on defence conversion, which 
boasted several hundred entries. If anything, the con-
ceptual approach to studying conversion became de-
cidedly narrowed in the course of the 1990s—and this 
narrowing might go some way in explaining why the 
study of conversion went out of style around the turn 
of the millennium.  
If there are some relevant insights to be gained 
from Conversion Studies, then we must go back to 
the times predating the end of the Cold War. We need 
to ask ourselves: What were the motivations, inter-
ests, questions, standpoints, attitudes and objectives 
of Conversion Studies before there was an actual po-
litical demand for conversion? As it turns out, we find 
a contested arena of various inclinations, comprising 
a more economic and a more political branch, a more 
liberal and a more radical school, more narrow and 
very technical alongside broader, more encompassing 
approaches. There were those merely concerned with 
converting the assembly lines in a factory from the 
production of military to civilian goods. At the same 
time, a significant number of conversion scholars, of-
ten associated with the social activism and peace 
movements of the early 1980s, went beyond such lim-
ited aims and developed larger visions of how we 
might move from a world of war to a world of peace. 
In retrospect, it is certainly easy to dismiss their writ-
ings on the grounds of the often naive and idealistic 
assumptions that guided their analyses and do not 
withstand closer scrutiny today. Nevertheless, we 
should acknowledge that these scholars made an ef-
fort to think against the grain of the arguably no less 
naive axioms of mainstream Security and Strategic 
Studies of the day. In doing so, they tried to formulate 
concrete normative visions of the future, never 
Introduction
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empirical as well as normative and conceptual 
grounds, in turn fundamentally challenging the core 
idea of conversion itself. Maybe a newly revived aca-
demic engagement with the issue at hand should un-
derstand itself as ‘Post-Conversion Studies’. That is to 
say: While explicitly situating itself within the tradi-
tion of Conversion Studies, and thereby not least re-
taining its critical, normative and emancipatory spir-
it, it would simultaneously always question the very 
parameters that render conversion a coherent and 
somewhat intelligible concept.
The Paper is organized into three main parts. The 
first begins with an inquiry into the meaning of the 
term conversion, before tracing the history of Conver-
sion Studies from the end of World War II to the 
1980s. It considers different definitions of and ap-
proaches to conversion within this field and alludes 
to some of the main arguments and debates put for-
ward by conversion scholars, particularly as they re-
late to the causes and effects of militarization. Impor-
tantly, this first part suggests a basic distinction 
between two broad perspectives in Conversion Stud-
ies: The one conceives conversion as a largely techni-
cal undertaking reacting to an external political de-
mand; the other places a stronger emphasis on an 
understanding of conversion as a pro-active political 
process. 
The second part of the Paper analyzes how this 
distinction played out in the relocation of Conversion 
Studies as an academic field of inquiry after the end 
of the Cold War. Doing so, it identifies factors explain-
ing the gradual demise of the discipline as a relevant 
scholarly subject within Peace and Conflict Research. 
The third and final part explores the extent to 
which it may be worthwhile to resuscitate aspects of 
Conversion Studies in the new millennium. Can an 
argument be made that conversion is still a relevant 
analytical concept? Or is it better left dead and bur-
ied? The Paper concludes with six propositions that 
ought to be taken into account when answering 
these questions.
content with simply describing the world as it is, but 
always motivated by a desire to change it. What is 
more, most agreed that this task required a deeper 
understanding of the political economy of organized 
violence in society, the causes and effects of invest-
ments into the military and security sector, and par-
ticularly the vested economic interests of the armed 
forces and defence industries. Notwithstanding some 
notable exceptions, it appears that this overall ap-
proach does not figure very prominently in cur-
rent-day Peace and Conflict Research. A review of old-
time Conversion Studies might be an occasion to 
discuss the validity of this neglect in the 21st century.  
This Paper does not propose a new research agen-
da. Its purpose is comparatively modest, although 
still quite ambitious and challenging. Given the vir-
tual absence of conversion as a relevant subject of 
Peace and Conflict Research today, it aspires to tell a 
brief history of Conversion Studies. This history, it ar-
gues, may partly inspire us to be more courageous 
when reflecting upon and disclosing our normative 
predispositions, to think about and clearly state what 
kind of world we are working toward in the research 
we do. It could also alert us to some empirical phe-
nomena that we have neglected, although they re-
main relevant. Related to this, it might make us re-
consider the widespread implicit assumption 
according to which a quantitative (and often heavily 
economic) emphasis on ‘facts and figures’ necessarily 
precludes more normative and emancipatory re-
search designs. To revisit the rise and downfall of 
Conversion Studies equally draws attention to a dan-
gerous pitfall: A discipline that all too easily aban-
dons pro-active criticality for the sake of following 
the footsteps of political demand may find itself as all 
but water under the bridge once this demand has 
subsided.  
There are, then, some good reasons to revisit the 
past. Yet, the concept of conversion is not without its 
problems. Its main shortcoming concerns the overtly 
simplistic dichotomy between the military and the 
civilian—or between war and peace—on which it 
commonly relied. In the complex world of today (but 
arguably also in the just as complex worlds of former 
times) things rarely come as clear-cut as that. The 
distinction can be rightfully called into question on 
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and less well-known application of the term: military 
or defence conversion. The basic idea is not new, to be 
sure—and also a popular theme of Christian scripture. 
As the well-known passage in the Book of Isaiah 
sums it up, “and they shall beat their swords into 
ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks” 
(Isaiah 2:4). At the most general level, defence conver-
sion may be defined as the transformation of some-
thing military into something civilian. Similar to 
faith-conversion, which relies on an initial distinction 
between the believers and the non-believers, it thus 
requires the separation between two social spheres: 
the civilian and the non-civilian or military. At the 
same time, conversion intimately connects these two 
opposing poles with each other, for it denotes the 
very process whereby the one morphs into the other. 
Hence, and just as faith-conversion does not burn the 
heretic at the stake, defence conversion suggests an 
internal transformation of the converted object, from 
military to civilian. 
Two observations follow from this. On the one 
hand, conversion always involves a reduction, a 
shrinking of the military realm, whatever this may 
mean in a concrete case. For example, if a defence 
company diversifies its production portfolio and  
enters civilian markets, while nonetheless continuing 
to produce and sell military goods on the same scale 
as before, this would not count as conversion (see  
Dumas, 1995, pp. 18–19; Brzoska, 2000, pp. 134–35). As 
Southwood explained, it would need a “once-for-all 
re-employment of a firm’s defense resources to civil-
ian use” (1997, p. 100). On the other hand, defence con-
version ought not to be confused with arms control or 
disarmament. Restrictions in the procurement, 
stockpiling and transfer of military resources may 
help to prevent an arms race from spiralling out of 
control; yet, they do not necessarily transform the 
status quo between military and civilian resources 
within a given society (see Roberts, 1991, p. 77). And 
whereas an actual reduction in armament might  
create a certain potential for conversion—and is,  
arguably, a precondition for any such process to come 
about in the first place—the former may well proceed 
despite the latter (see BICC, 1996, p. 17). Brzoska noted 
The etymological roots of the term conversion go 
back to the Latin noun conversio, which translates as 
‘a turning round, revolving, revolution’, sometimes 
also ‘subversion, alteration, change’ or a ‘change of 
view or opinion’. A common modern dictionary de-
fines conversion as ‘the process of changing or causing 
something to change from one form to another’. This, 
of course, is a rather broad understanding that invites 
a range of applications across various contexts. On 
the one hand, conversion has acquired numerous 
‘technical’ connotations, for example in finance (the 
changing of one currency into another) or medicine 
(‘conversion disorder’) (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, 
pp. 16–17). On the other hand, many people associate 
the term with a religious meaning. According to 
Catholic dogma, conversion refers to the process 
whereby a ‘misguided’ individual abandons his or her 
‘old’ belief and embraces the ‘true faith’ of the church 
(see Breitschwerdt, 1988/9, p. 10; Albrecht, 1979, pp. 17–18). 
This move may be voluntary; it may be enforced from 
the outside. In either case, the specifically religious 
appropriation of conversion points to an actively ini-
tiated process that differs from any more mechanical 
or neutral transformation in three significant ways. 
First of all, it does not presuppose the disappearance—
or full-scale destruction—of the converted object. To 
convert is not to replace one thing with another, alto-
gether different thing; it is to effect a substantive 
change within the internal composition of one and 
the same entity (or individual). Second, conversion 
seeks to align its object with the general and accepted 
norms of society; by way of contrast, the act of de-
nouncing those norms and becoming an outcast 
could be characterized by its antonym ‘perversion’. 
Third, whoever becomes converted experiences a pos-
itive enhancement of his or her quality—not simply 
in the eyes of the community but also in terms of an 
independent and absolute truth. Conversion always 
denotes something desirable and good: The end of  
delusion and return to the comforting lap of the one 
and only, eternal order of things.
The explicitly normative aspects first encoun-
tered in the religious understanding of faith-conver-
sion resonate with another, comparatively younger 
Conversion: The basic idea 
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Nevertheless, the main distinction I would like to 
propose here concerns not so much the conversion 
process in and by itself, but rather the academic study 
and engagement with conversion as a problem, that 
is the problematization of conversion. How does Conver- 
sion Studies position itself vis-à-vis the political and 
social agents and structures that it addresses? Does it 
problematize the presence or, on the contrary, the  
absence of conversion? It seems that publications on 
the issue can be situated along a continuum between 
two extreme positions: an economic and technical 
and a more pro-active, political approach.  
that disarmament and demobilization could conceiv-
ably even contribute to enhancing—rather than  
diminishing—defence capabilities, for instance by 
streamlining the military sector and thereby making 
it more efficient and effective (1999b, pp. 15–16). 
Conversion, then, is not solely concerned with 
putting a lid on or downsizing the military forces 
and/or defence industry. Instead, it directs its main 
attention to the civilian benefits that any such measures 
need to entail. For example, it would not be sufficient 
to simply close down a weapons-producing factory 
and dismiss the workforce. The central question is 
how the freed labour could be put to an alternative, 
socially productive use. Swords are not beaten into 
scrap; they are beaten into ploughshares.
This broad conceptualization of defence conver-
sion leaves a number of important questions un-  
answered. How does conversion come about? What is 
its scope? Can every decrease in military resources be 
translated into tangible civilian goods? Or should 
conversion rather focus on particular resources? And 
what is a ‘socially productive’ civilian good anyway? 
However, as Bjorn Møller pointed out, such questions 
are “probably more useful for specifying particular 
versions of conversion than for distinguishing con-
version from something completely different” (1996,  
p. 10). They shed some light on Brzoska’s observation 
that “conversion is a contested concept” (1999b, p. 15). 
The academic study of defence conversion is any-
thing but a homogeneous field of inquiry. Reviewing 
the relevant literature, it quickly becomes clear that 
there is—or, rather was—no such thing as ‘the one 
and only’ way to write and think about conversion. 
Conversion Studies encompassed a wide variety of 
scholarly dispositions, approaches and objectives. 
Most commonly, different understandings were dis-
tinguished regarding the scale of conversion (local/ 
national/ global) and/or the types of resources to be 
converted (see e.g., Laurance et al., 1995; Brzoska, 
1999a; 1999b). And, of course, it makes a difference 
whether an effort at conversion is only concerned 
with, say, a single factory or military base, or whether 
it directs its attention to the military expenditure of 
a country or even the whole world.          
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Many writings on conversion reacted to an exter-
nal political demand, some decision to convert some 
parts of the military or defence infrastructure. In 
such cases, conversion poses—above all else—a tech-
nical problem or challenge to scholars. What kind of 
knowledge and techniques would such a process  
require? How can it be organized effectively and effi-
ciently? As it happens, these were the principal ques-
tions on the mind of the American economists who 
popularly coined the idea of defence conversion as 
World War II was drawing to a close (see Boulding, 
1983, p. 163). They were a very practical response to the 
straightforward problem that the US economy was 
facing at the time, namely an undesired surplus in 
military production and labour due to decreasing  
(political) demand for weapons and soldiers. A shock 
therapy of simply dismantling substantial portions of 
the defence industry and dismissing countless workers 
alongside armed forces’ personnel was ruled out  
because this may have generated widespread unem-
ployment and social unrest. The export of military 
goods and services to foreign markets was equally out 
of the question since the possible demand elsewhere 
could not have been met without undermining one’s 
own foreign policy goals. Given these considerations, 
the notion of defence conversion appeared as an  
attractive third strategy to US government officials.  
It promised to reduce military capacities while at the 
same time not only averting unemployment but cre-
ating a number of social and economic benefits (see 
Albrecht, 1979, p. 9). As it turned out, the diligently 
planned and executed conversion of large parts of the 
US defence sector in the late 1940s was very much a 
success story that would be frequently invoked by later 
proponents of military downsizing (see Melman, 1974, 
p. 2.; Bischak & Raffel, 1992, pp. 2–3; Bischak & Yudken, 
1993, pp. 174–75; Klein, 1993, pp. 18–19; Intriligator, 1996, 
pp. 8–10).
Publications concerned with the technical man-
agement of conversion processes continued to appear 
with some frequency over the following decades. The 
need for such expertise persisted, albeit on a much 
smaller scale than beforehand. For example, US  
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara closed down 
a number of military bases in the early 1960s, often 
with severe economic ramifications for surrounding 
communities. Similarly, cuts in the US space pro-
gramme in the early 1970s seriously affected some 
parts of the defence industry (see Albrecht, 1979, p. 9). 
Looking through the vast literature on defence 
conversion, published over a period of almost five 
decades, it quickly becomes clear that most writings 
adopted a very technical and economic focus. Theo-
retically, of course, the conversion of a military object 
could also include the transformation of militaristic 
attitudes, mindsets or perceptions. Yet, the civilian 
benefits of such processes would, arguably, be a lot 
harder to pin down than concrete material redistri-
butions. As Seymour Melman insisted, the concept of 
defence conversion “pertains to the actual physical 
resources used for military purposes” (1992, p. 139). For 
this reason, it was, in fact, commonly characterized 
as ‘economic conversion’.
In the narrowest understanding, economic con-
version applied only to the defence industry: to factories, 
assembly lines and, not least, human labour (see 
Gummet, 1997). Brzoska observed that this was very 
much “the focus of the debate in the 1970s and early 
1980s” (1999a, p. 133). Sometimes also termed “industrial 
conversion” (Brzoska, 2000, p. 134) or “direct conversion” 
(Hartley, 1997, p. 93; Struys, 1999, p. 34), its concern was, 
quite simply, with shifts “from the production of mil-
itary to civilian goods” (Brzoska 1999a, p. 133). Individual 
studies differed in terms of the scale they analyzed, 
which could range from global over national indus-
trial transformations to very specific reorientations 
within only parts of a single production plant (see 
Brzoska, 2000, p. 134). Gummet and also Southwood 
distinguished between three major focal points in 
the literature. The first “attempts to change what is 
produced in an individual plant” (Gummet, 1997,  
pp. 35–36), sometimes also characterized as the “factory- 
based approach” (Southwood, 1997, p. 101) or “firm-level 
conversion” (Brzoska, 2000, p. 134). The second  
“attempts to alter the overall product range of a firm”, 
which may include several production facilities, pos-
sibly located in various places (Gummet, 1997, pp. 35–36). 
Southwood referred to this as the “company-based 
Economic conversion as a technical challenge
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approach” (1997, p. 100). The third “attempts to gener-
ate new foci of economic growth in a region” (Gummet, 
1997, pp. 35–36). Such a “community-based approach” 
(Southwood. 1997, p. 102) need not limit itself to 
changes within one or more factories. It might even 
close down military production sites completely, as 
long as the workforce is relocated to a different facility 
to produce civilian goods. Whereas the former two 
types have been categorized as cases of internal con-
version (i.e. taking place within a single plant or com-
pany), the latter is also referred to as external conver-
sion, i.e. the transition of labour from one factory or 
company to another (see Dumas, 1996, pp. 140–41).           
Although the defence industry was certainly an 
important focus of Conversion Studies, various scholars 
adopted a broader perspective (see Brzoska, 1999a; 
Hartley, 1997, p. 3). Besides the ‘direct’ conversion of 
industrial facilities and labour, conversion could also 
pertain more generally to military personnel, infra-
structure or capital. In this case, it was sometimes 
distinguished from the former as indirect conversion 
(see Table 1). Again, however, the resource in question 
would need to be transformed to benefit or enhance 
non-military social goods: The successful reintegra-
tion of soldiers into civilian life and workplaces, the 
reconstruction of military bases, for instance for social 
housing schemes, or the redirection of a government’s 
defence expenditures into, say, health or education 
budgets. As illustrated by the various definitions of 
defence conversion in Box 1, in the 1990s, this broad 
understanding—referred to by BICC as the “‘resource 
re-use perspective”’ (Brzoska, 2000)—was, while 
maintaining the economic focus, very much the con-
sensus among scholars.  
Economic conversion may address various types 
of material resources. Still, the focus on economic  
aspects lent itself to a rather narrow and limited  
academic perspective. Lisa Peattie wrote in 1988 that 
economic conversion was “most frequently thought 
of as a set of essentially technically projects” (p. 11). In 
this understanding, it is easy to imagine conversion 
as the reaction to a situational change that is brought 
about independently and thought of as somehow 
problematic. A defence corporation might be con-
fronted with a sudden decrease in demand for the 
weapons it produces. A community might be faced 
with the closure of a military base in its vicinity, thus 
losing an important source of income for its local 
economy. In either case, conversion would be one 
among other options the affected actors could choose 
to pursue. The defence corporation may try to switch 
to the manufacture of civilian goods; alternatively, it 
may seek to enter new markets and sell its weapons 
abroad or even shut down production lines completely. 
The local community may attract investors to convert 
the formerly military buildings to, say, a holiday resort, 
thereby generating new economic opportunities for 
itself—or some of its inhabitants may simply migrate 
to different places with brighter prospects for making 
a living. 
In all likelihood, actors will only opt for conversion 
if it appears as a viable strategy that promises a great-
er return than any of the alternative possibilities. 
Sometimes, divergent interests within the groups or 
institutions in question could lead to conflicts over 
whether or not to implement a conversion process. 
To stick with the example of the aforementioned  
defence corporation: Whereas the workers might 
DIRECT / INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION INDIRECT  CONVERSION
INTERNAL CONVERSION EXTERNAL CONVERSION \  CONVERSION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 
    (‘REINTEGRATION’)
\  CONVERSION OF MILITARY BASES 
    (‘BASE CONVERSION’)
\  CONVERSION OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
\  FACTORY-BASED / FIRM 
   LEVEL 
\  COMPANY-BASED
\ COMMUNITY-BASED
Table 1  
Typology of economic conversion
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consider conversion an ideal means for retaining 
their jobs, the executive management may expect 
higher profit margins if parts of the workforce are 
simply dismissed. The important point to keep in 
mind is that for this kind of conversion to come 
about, its objectives need to be grounded in the eco-
nomic self-interests of the affected constituents who 
initiate it. As such, and although potentially broad in 
scope, the scale of conversion usually remains small, 
concerned with a set of microeconomic challenges 
(and possible conflicts) encountered in a specific pro-
duction facility or local community (see Møller, 1996, 
p. 9). This type of conversion is arguably apolitical, 
meaning that it serves no higher purpose than to  
secure the socio-economic status quo of a particular 
group. “Economic conversion” is often only about  
preventing “a loss of employment or firm closures” 
(Struys, 1999, p. 34). In some cases, it may even be “no 
more than a mopping up operation” and “part of the 
process of making the defence industry more effi-
cient” (Southwood, 1997, p. 100).
Box 1  
General definitions of economic defence conversion
[E]conomic defence conversion seeks to redirect military resources in such a manner that they are put to non-military, productive or ‘civilian’ use. 
It can refer to the reallocation of capital, public funds formerly invested into the defence sector, to the redesign of the means of production or the 
reorientation of human labour (Dumas, 1977).  
 
Economic conversion refers to the process of moving labor, capital and other resources from the military to the civilian economy (Bischak &  
Raffel, 1992, p. 1).  
 
Conversion is plain and simple—a shift from military to civilian activity using released personnel and facilities that were formerly devoted to  
defence production (Klein, 1993, p. 17). 
 
Conversion reaches into the economy and redirects human and capital resources from military to civilian-oriented activity (Dumas, 1995, p. 6). 
 
The problem of defense conversion is that of shifting defense production into non-defense civilian production. Of particular importance in the  
process of conversion is that of shifting labor and capital from military production to civilian production. Labor, in the form of armed forces  
personnel and defense plant workers, must be redirected to produce civilian goods. Capital, including both military bases and plant and equip-
ment producing military goods and services, must be transformed so as to be able to produce civilian goods (Intriligator, 1996, p. 3). 
 
The conversion challenge is to achieve a re-allocation of resources from the military to the civilian sectors of the economy (Hartley, 1997, p. 83). 
 
[I]n its broadest sense, conversion is the allocation of military capacities to civilian use (Struys, 1999, p. 34).
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If one conceives of conversion as a more political 
project, it becomes less a technical reaction to some 
shift in external circumstances, premised on main-
taining some social and economic status quo (employ-
ment, turnover). Quite the contrary, conversion would 
seek to pro-actively transform existing social and 
economic conditions. Whereas this political take on 
the issue may still be concerned with a very limited 
scale or object, i.e. a single factory or local community, 
more commonly it assumed a broader perspective 
and addressed the problems of an entire country or 
even the whole world. In comparison to industrial 
and base conversion, the question of, for example,  
reallocating public expenditures on the military 
moved up on the agenda of Conversion Studies.  
The questions and tasks differed from those writ-
ings that were merely reacting to some very specific 
requirements of the government. For a start, scholars 
needed to empirically demonstrate that investments 
in the defence sector were, by and large, a social and 
economic burden, not a benefit. At least throughout 
the 1970s, conversion scholars thus often remained 
clearly within the discipline of economic science, 
usually applying macroeconomic analytical frame-
works (see Albrecht, 1979, p. 10). This included econo-
metric models to quantify the opportunity costs of  
investments into the defence sector (e.g. Stone, 1973), 
substitution and trade-off analyses to calculate  
potential impacts of reduced military spending on 
other public budgets (e.g. Russett, 1970; Caputo, 1975), 
parametric cost comparisons of military and civilian 
enterprises (e.g. Clayton, 1972; Sivard, 1977), or more 
sophisticated methods for comparing the wider socio- 
economic effects of projected changes in defence  
expenditures to similar changes in, say, health  
expenditure (e.g. United Nations, 1977). The main pur-
pose behind these studies was to highlight the antici-
pated benefits that would result from a reallocation of 
military resources (mostly in the form of capital) to 
civilian uses. Rather than being concerned with the 
particularistic economic self-interest of workers in a 
specific defence plant, scholars wanted to demon-
strate the value of large-scale conversion for society 
as a whole. 
The more technical and economy-oriented  
perspective only describes part of conversion-related 
studies and research activities. In the course of the 
1970s and, especially the 1980s, it is possible to discern 
an increasing politicization of Conversion Studies,  
accompanied by a broadening of issues beyond a 
mere concern with economic problems. In a 1988 
special issue on defence conversion in the ‘Bulletin 
for Peace Proposals’, Michael Renner argued that con-
version “ought to be more than just a mechanism to 
adjust for fluctuations and piecemeal reductions in 
military spending” (p. 138). As Peattie seconded, it 
should really be considered “a political movement that 
addresses the economic basis of what in international 
relations is known as ‘the arms race’ and in domestic 
politics can be thought of as ‘militarism’ ” (p. 11). 
Renner’s and Peattie’s proposal was not wholly 
new. A comparatively smaller, nevertheless still sig-
nificant and influential strand of Conversion Studies 
had been doing just that for quite some time. Unlike 
the approaches discussed above, it was concerned 
with the absence of a large-scale conversion project 
behind the backdrop of what US President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, in his famous 1961 farewell address, had 
warningly characterized as an emerging “military–
industrial complex”. Notwithstanding occasional 
problems in individual communities and industry 
sectors, US military spending as a whole had signifi-
cantly increased over the Cold War period, sustaining 
an ever-expanding defence–industrial base, the social 
value of which was increasingly contested, especially 
during the economic recession of the mid-1970s. A 
popular critique of ‘development’ policy blamed high 
levels of armament in the donor countries—as well as 
the Third World itself—for the failure of the develop-
ment-project to deliver on its promises (see Boulding, 
1983, pp. 166–69). What is more, in the 1980s, the neo-
liberal and conservative policies of Ronald Reagan 
and Margret Thatcher severely circumscribed spending 
on social welfare while maintaining (or even increasing) 
defence and military expenditure (see Breitschwerdt, 
1988/89, p. 11). The politicization of Conversion Studies 
also neatly tied in with the concerns of new social 
movements advocating ecological sustainability and 
a world free of nuclear weapons (see Boulding, 1983, 
pp. 172–73). 
The politicization of Conversion Studies
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Besides its continual leaning towards economic 
science, the politicization of Conversion Studies  
also attracted political scientists (see Albrecht, 1979,  
pp. 53–54). The focus of their questions was less on the  
anticipated effects as rather on the social conditions 
of conversion: Under what circumstances can we  
expect to realistically implement a conversion pro-
cess? What is required for it to be successful? What 
sustains resistance to conversion? How can such  
resistance be overcome? Or, to put it differently: Why 
do we have such a thing as the ‘military’ sector? 
What arguments actually explain and justify arma-
ment and military build-up? And how is it possible to 
effectively counter these arguments? 
Since it combines both an economic and a political 
outlook, the pioneering work of Seymour Melman, up 
to his death in 2004 professor of Industrial Engineering 
and Operations Research at Columbia University and 
one of the most well-known founding fathers of Con-
version Studies, deserves particular scrutiny here. His 
overall objective was to unmask and delegitimize the 
“ideologists of military power” that advocated the  
“necessity of war economy” (Melman, 1974, p. 122). This 
required a critical engagement with a number of pop-
ular claims about both the causes and effects of mili-
tarization. The following section will look at both de-
bates, which were highly influential within the 
political wing of Conversion Studies, in some more 
detail.
Causes of militarization: The military–
industrial complex
Up until the 1960s, peace researchers and the 
classical Realists in International Relations (IR) theory 
largely agreed in that inter-state rivalry was the prin-
cipal factor explaining rises in defence expenditure 
and military build-up, the main disagreement being 
whether this resulted in more security or more inse-
curity for the parties involved (see Glaser, 2000).  
Investments in the defence sector, conventional wis-
dom held, were excited by geostrategic considerations, 
ideological differences, threat perceptions and the 
quest for security. However, in the course of the 1960s, 
and particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, various 
scholars began to question this viewpoint. In 1988, 
Renner wrote that the arms race between the super-
powers had reached “a self-sustained momentum with 
little real causal relationship to national security” (p. 
129). Already a decade earlier, a comprehensive study 
had failed to detect any correlation between varia-
tions in inter-state conflict intensities and changes 
in military expenditure (see Senger, 1975). Some ar-
gued that increasing militarization, accompanied by 
the evocation of an Evil Empire instilling a perma-
nent state of fear in people, was occasioned by domes-
tic concerns over social fragmentation and civil un-
rest, a “means for inducing compliance and maintain 
the existing order” and “of keeping the citizenry in 
line” (Peattie, 1988, p. 12). Others emphasized econom-
ic motives. Mary Kaldor related rises in British and 
US military spending during the 20th century to ef-
forts of governments to support declining industry 
branches in the wake of technological changes (1978, 
p. 324). Similarly, Dana Dunn stressed the importance 
of ensuring employment: 
[W]e need weapons contracts to provide jobs for de-
fense workers. In order to produce the weapons, we 
must fund a massive defense budget or radically in-
crease arms sales around the world. In order to justi-
fy such allocation of resources, we need a threatening 
enemy. Defense workers also require this socially con-
structed enemy in order to rationalize their work 
(1995, p. 40). 
Such arguments were closely related to a more 
general theory according to which military build-up 
was driven by the vested economic interests of certain 
coalition groups that were organized in what became 
known as the ‘military–industrial complex’ (MIC) 
(see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, pp. 17–18; also Bischak, 
1993, p. 133). Gaining popularity in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the MIC was a somewhat vague concept accommo-
dating a wide spectrum of political inclinations and 
various theoretical and empirical assumptions (see 
Albrecht, 1978). The perhaps most comprehensive—and 
consistent—account of the US American MIC was 
provided by Melman. Having outlined its central  
elements in his 1970 book Pentagon Capitalism, he 
clearly spelled out its organizational characteristics 
four years later in The Permanent War Economy 
(1974).
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administrators, militaries, defence-industrial manag-
ers and workers would drive these groups to resist 
any disarmament initiative and presented, in fact, 
the greatest obstacle to any such effort (see Melman, 
1974, pp. 59–61). The arms race could not simply be end-
ed by venturing out into the realm of international 
politics. The greater challenge was of an economic 
and domestic nature, namely to render the disman-
tling of the defence  
sector beneficial to the very people that profited from 
it—and thereby winning their support. Conversion, 
then, appeared as a lot more than simply the promise 
of an ‘added economic value’ to a process of disarma-
ment, itself brought about by other means. Quite the 
contrary: Economic conversion became the principal 
political strategy necessary to realize disarmament in 
the first place (see Breitschwerdt, 1988/89, p. 11). Nota-
bly, this did not necessarily imply a break or conflict 
with the more limited and technical approaches to 
conversion outlined earlier. Indeed, much of the  
conversion literature in political science highlighted 
the potential of the concept to build bridges between 
different interest groups and form political coalitions, 
for example between trade unions and the peace 
movement (see Peattie, 1988, p. 15).
Effects of militarization: The depleted 
economy
A central thesis of Conversion Studies was that 
militarization could be primarily explained by vested 
economic interests within the MIC rather than polit-
ical concerns over (in)security. Conversion was thus 
the key to disarmament (instead of, for instance,  
establishing a system of collective security, which 
was also discussed at the time). Nevertheless, and 
even if correct, this claim did not expound why con-
version and disarmament ought to be pursued in the 
first place. In fact, if the real driver behind militariza-
tion were merely economic self-interest—rather than 
the preparation for war—increases in  
armament may not have been as bad as critical IR 
scholars made them out to be when they pointed to 
the dangers of arms races and the “security dilemma” 
(e.g. Herz 1950). What is more, a popular argument 
Importantly, Melman argued that the political 
economy of the US defence sector significantly dif-
fered from the usual dynamics of civilian markets 
(1974, p. 54). Whereas, by all outward appearances, it 
mimicked some normal features of private capitalism, 
it ought to be regarded as “a full-fledged centrally 
managed industrial system” (p. 20) whose “top  
directorate is located in government” (p. 59). In this 
advanced MIC, which Melman labelled the “war 
economy” (p. 260) of “militarized state capitalism”  
(p. 299)—and later scholars would alternatively dub 
the “war machine” (Renner, 1988, p. 132) or the  
“welfare–warfare state” (Peattie, 1988, p. 12)—decision- 
making power was not dispersed between structurally 
differentiated positions of producers and consumers. 
Instead, both sides were collapsed within a single, 
more or less homogeneous body that joined “peak  
political and economic” leverage (Melman, 1974, p. 60). 
Just as Eisenhower had feared, the MIC represented 
“a concentration of power hitherto unknown in Amer-
ican experience” (pp. 20–21). 
The crucial assumption was that the symbiotic 
relationships between government bureaucrats, the 
military and its defence–industrial base had become 
so intimate, uncoupled from both civilian economy 
and effective democratic control, that decisions over 
defence spending, military research and development 
and the acquisition of new weapons were less guided 
by some public interest (be it manifest in real or im-
agined security concerns and cost-efficiency) as by 
the personal interests of those that partook in the 
war economy and derived some (usually material) 
benefits and privileges from it (see Melman, 1974, p. 
54). For Melman, the “post World War II American 
war economy was developed and sustained by politi-
cal decisions” that “were rooted in an economic in-
terest base of part of the economy” (p. 287) and affect-
ed only “a minority of American society” (p. 280; see 
also Huffschmid, 1977, p. 23).  
This theory on the causes of militarization had 
significant consequences for formulating a politics of 
conversion. For a start, it was clear that any impulse 
to change or transform the present order would not 
originate from within the military–industrial complex 
itself. The vested interests conjoining public 
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production managing” (Melman, 1974, p. 21). Any com-
pany that becomes part of a MIC works “under the  
assumption that indefinitely large capital funds are 
available for the military” (p. 65). This clearly differs 
from the expectations of agents in private capitalism; 
here, businesses need to compete against other com-
panies over prices, keep costs to a minimum and 
learn to cope with “uncertainties stemming from un-
predictable market behavior”, always threatened by 
possible under-consumption (p. 60). In the state- con-
trolled war economy such nuisances do not exist. The 
money flows from a single source that tends to give 
the military and its needs “first place” in capital allo-
cation (pp. 60–61). The “terms of competition are not 
price and efficiency, but grantcraft and lobbying” (Pe-
attie, 1998, p. 12). Military corporations are “subsi-
dy-maximiz- ing firms” (Melman, 1974, p. 55). Instead 
of minimizing costs and maximizing profits, as in tra-
ditional market economies, they seek to maximize 
costs and maximize the subsidies they receive from 
the state (see p. 21; also Renner, 1988, p. 133; Dumas 
1995, pp. 13–14). 
Poor performance and a tendency to overprice 
might be worrisome features of the defence industry; 
by themselves they do not necessarily imply direct 
negative repercussions for the civilian economy, 
however. To make this argument, a second character-
istic needs to be taken into account, namely “the 
basic non-productive” (Melman, 1974, p. 19) or even 
“parasitic nature of military economy” (p. 62; also 
Klein, 1993, pp. 15–16; Dumas, 1995, p. 8). This insight 
itself is anything but new. No one less than Adam 
Smith had contended in his Wealth of Nations, pub-
lished in 1776, that the “sovereign” with 
all the officers both of justice and war who serve under 
him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive  
labourers. They are servants of the public, and are 
maintained by a part of the annual produce of the  
industry of other people. Their service […] produces 
nothing for which an equal quantity of service can 
afterwards be procured (Smith, 2001, p. 221).
In the same vein, Melman argued that the war 
economy does “not yield ordinary economic use-value”, 
that is, “usefulness for the level of living (consumer 
goods and services)” or “usefulness for further 
held that investments into the defence sector even 
yielded positive economic externalities for society as 
a whole. This view had been particularly popular dur-
ing the 1940s and 1950s, where excessive military 
spending was commonly considered an effective 
means of averting economic recession. As Dumas 
summed up the general argument, 
the defence sector creates jobs and provides an addi-
tional source of demand to stimulate economic activ-
ity [...]. It drives the discovery of new technology 
with important application to civilian purposes, 
technology that ultimately results in rising produc-
tivity and better products. And by the threat it poses 
to other nations, a high level of military expenditure 
guarantees access to both needed raw materials and 
profitable product markets (1988, p. 1).
Not all of these claims could be easily dismissed. 
Dumas himself acknowledged that some of them 
contained a grain of truth. Renner, just as Dumas an 
advocate of conversion, similarly conceded that various 
“criteria crucial to the development of the industrial 
system as we know it today—uniformity, repeatability, 
predictability, mathematical quantifiability, and com-
mand and control features—find their origin at least 
in part in the requirements of the military system” 
(1988, p. 131). The “war machine”, he went on, acceler-
ated “the speed of standardization and mass produc-
tion from the sixteenth century on” and has therefore 
been “central to industrial development since the 
dawn of the Industrial Revolution” (pp. 131–32; see 
also Mumford, 1977, pp. 504–06).
If conversion were to be demanded and pursued, 
scholars needed to seriously engage with economic 
justifications for investing in the military. Dumas 
eventually concluded that they were gravely out-
weighed by a variety of additional factors “rather dra-
matically revers[ing] the ultimate conclusion” (1988, 
p. 4). Melman’s study of the American MIC suggests 
three interrelated arguments for the negative social 
and economic effects of armament and militarization. 
First, defence production usually does not measure 
up to its equivalent in the civilian economy. Since 
military–industry firms operate “in an insulated  
monopoly market”, they are prone to “poor productivity 
performance, to poor product design and poor 
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In no other country has there been a military econo-
my that is comparable to the American one in size 
and longevity. Having endured for thirty years, it has 
occupied the occupational lifetime of millions of 
workers, technicians, managers and soldiers. Never 
before in American experience has the military estab-
lishment utilised so many industrial and other facili-
ties, […] constructed specifically for military require-
ments (pp. 226–27). 
Melman found that the defence sector had become 
“a major source of corrosion of the productive compe-
tence of the American economy as a whole” (p. 260). It 
is thus that the need for conversion was considered 
all the more urgent and imperative. 
Liberal vs. radical Conversion Studies
Melman’s arguments on the causes and effects of 
militarization and armament influenced many of the 
more political writings in the field of Conversion 
Studies. Sometimes referred to as the “liberal school” 
(Albrecht 1979, p. 12), they placed the main emphasis 
on fostering economic growth. Disarmament was 
considered to be in the best economic interest of soci-
ety—and conversion a means to install an “economic 
system unburdened by the debilitating effects of ex-
cessive military spending” and therefore “able to 
make greater strides in improving the material con-
ditions of life” (Dumas, 1988, p. 7). The propositions of 
Melman, in particular, were commonly read as an  
attempt toward “making the American economy 
more competitive internationally” (Peattie, 1998, p. 17; 
also Abrecht 1979, p. 58). His perspective certainly dif-
fered from those more technical approaches that  
regarded conversion as nothing but the reaction of a 
defence plant or community to changes in the status 
quo. In opposition to the dominant Cold War ideolo-
gies of the time, calling for ever more military invest-
ments, Melman and other liberal scholars  
assumed a pro-active, political stance that advocated 
the transformation of military overcapacities. How-
ever, to their mind, the central economic, political 
and cultural coordinates of society ought to be left 
more or less intact. At no point, for instance, did Melman 
propose to completely abolish the military. As Dumas 
production (as in machinery tools being used to 
make other articles” (1974, p. 19; also Dumas, 1988, p. 3). 
All resources that are spent on the military could 
have potentially been invested in productive civilian 
activities. The defence sector always entails opportu-
nity costs for the larger economy that sustains it. It 
diminishes “productive capacities by withdrawing 
resources from civilian economy”. As Melman had it, 
it “is, in fact, an anti-economy” (1974, p. 285). Or, in the 
words of Dumas, military spending “is an economic 
burden, not an economic boon” (Dumas, 1988, p. 4). 
While this assessment is shared by economists 
from all persuasions (see Albrecht 1979, p. 76), it does 
not necessarily render all defence expenses undesira-
ble. For Adam Smith, the doubtlessly parasitic quality 
of the military was justified, since it served the “use-
ful” and “necessary” (Smith, 2001, p. 221) purpose of 
“defending the society from the violence and injustice 
of other independent societies” (p. 386). However, if 
one follows the parallel argument concerning the 
causes of militarization and accepts that military 
build-up and security policy have become largely un-
coupled from one another, then the Smithian caveat 
no longer holds. The war machine drains resources 
from the civilian economy while delivering no public 
good in return (see Melman, 1974, p. 63). 
This may not be too damaging, provided the de-
fence industry constitutes only a small fraction of the 
overall productive capacities of society. Unfortunately, 
for Melman and other conversion scholars, the third 
characteristic of the US American military–industrial 
system was its “propensity to expand” (Melman, 1974, 
pp. 64–65). Again, Adam Smith had somewhat 
pre-empted this observation by pointing out that the 
military “grows gradually more and more expensive 
as the society advances in civilization” (2001, p. 386). 
And indeed, forever bent on the maximization of sub-
sidies, by the late 1960s the US American war econo-
my had eventually “become the dominant one as 
against the private capitalist economy in the United 
States” (Melman, 1974, p. 73). It dwarfed civilian econ-
omy in terms of “control over capital”, “control over 
research and development” and “control over means 
of production” (p. 70). 
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Given the dependency of the economic system on 
military investments, any large-scale effort at defence 
conversion would need to be accompanied by a more 
general conversion of capitalist modes of production, 
exchange and accumulation (see Albrecht 1979, p. 58; 
Breitschwerdt 1988/89, p. 13). To be sure: This claim 
remained a minority position in Conversion Studies. 
Marxist writers themselves disagreed on the validity 
of the ‘under-consumption’ theory. Some demon-
strated that economic crises had occurred despite 
military expenditure reaching peak levels (see Roth-
schild, 1956). Others pointed out that it simply no 
longer mattered in the nuclear age. As Renner observed: 
Even if war was ‘beneficial’ in the past to capitalist 
industry in the sense of serving as a ‘valve’ for over- 
production and over-accumulation, the tremendous 
and accelerating lethality of today’s weaponry has 
made major war antithetical to capitalism” (1988, p. 132). 
Moreover, the sheer magnitude of resources being 
poured into the MIC had long since surpassed any 
reasonable amount of non-productive spending  
required for—possibly—averting economic crises 
(which, by the way, could also be achieved through 
other wasteful expenditure). Even economists behind 
the Iron Curtain agreed that large-scale conversion 
could be achieved in the West without having to  
fundamentally transform its economic system (see 
Albrecht, 1979, p. 65). To argue otherwise, Melman noted, 
would only heighten broader social resistance to 
conversion and thereby play into the hands of those 
insisting on continuously high levels of military 
spending (see Melman 1974, pp. 289–90).
In any case, for most radical proponents of con-
version, the main line of division was not so much 
the question of maintaining or overcoming capital-
ism. Instead, they took issue with the rather narrow 
focus of liberals on economic concerns and sought to 
reconcile the purpose of conversion with a compara-
tively broader—and often distinctly pacifist—agenda, 
as it was popular among many social movements of 
the time. Conversion, for them, ought to be directed 
toward ‘peace’ rather than only economic growth. 
this is intended to guarantee the ‘normal’ recovery of the other share 
of the society’s overall capital. The limitation of defence expenditures 
[…] decreases the momentum countering the crisis tendencies of capi-
talism and thus exacerbates these crisis tendencies (own translation).
put it, “[w]ithin the bounds of affordability, levels of 
support for the military should be based on what is 
needed to achieve the mission of securing the nation 
against real and significant external military threats” 
(1995, p. 5). Moreover, if Melman at one point dreamt 
of “the formation of a new, post-capitalist society” 
(1974, p. 299), he was only thinking of the micro-level 
of capitalist relations, manifest in the hierarchical 
decision-making structure of the factory. As is evi-
dent from his criticism of the US American MIC,  
Melman displayed a clear preference for competitive, 
free markets as opposed to a state-directed economy. 
Not all advocates of conversion shared such sen-
timents for keeping the military and/or maintaining 
a capitalist macro-system. At least two divergent 
viewpoints, which Albrecht subsumed under the 
heading of the “radical school” in Conversion Studies, 
can be discerned here (see: Albrecht 1979, p. 12). The 
first, ironically, shared some common grounds with 
those that pointed to the ostensibly beneficial effects 
of military spending on society as a whole. As some 
Marxist scholars argued, non-productive investments 
helped to sustain productive capitalist relations. To 
their mind, the capitalist system relied on high levels 
of defence expenditure to remedy the structural 
problem of simultaneous overproduction and under-
consumption (see: Sweezy, 1974, pp. 20–21). The follow-
ing argument by Jörg Huffschmid illustrates this 
point well:
Die eigentliche ökonomische Funktion von Rüstungs- 
ausgaben ist es, der Tendenz zu Überakkumulation 
von Kapital und Überdproduktion von Waren da-
durch entgegenzuwirken, dass ein Teil des gesell-
schaftlichen Gesamtkapitals aus dem normalen  
Verwertungsprozess herausgezogen und künstlich 
verwertet wird, wodurch gleichzeitig die ‚normale’ 
Verwertung des anderen Teils des gesellschaftlichen 
Gesamtkapitals gewährleistet werden soll. Ein-
schränkung von Rüstungsausgaben […] baut ein den 
Krisentendenzen des Kapitalismus entgegenwirkendes 
Moment ab und verschärft daher diese Krisentendenzen 
(1977, p. 35).1 
1 \  It is the original economic purpose of defence expenditures to counter 
the tendency of over-accumulation of capital and overproduction of 
goods by taking out a part of the society’s overall capital from the nor-
mal recovery process and by recovering it artificially. At the same time, 
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it may even strive towards the “establishment of a 
just and lasting peaceful order” (p. 100). If it is under-
stood to serve such a broad objective, Brzoska noted 
that conversion loses “its economic focus” and, instead, 
needs to take account of “all kinds of economic,  
psychological, cultural and political changes” (1999a,  
p. 133). Economic conversion would be combined with 
what he called “societal” conversion, that is, efforts to 
convert and reduce “the influence of the military” 
and “militaristic thinking on societies and minds, for 
the purpose of ‘civilianization’ ” (1999b, p. 29). In line 
with such a pacifist agenda, a radical variant in Con-
version Studies promoted full-scale disarmament  
toward a “post-military order” (Boulding, 1983) as a 
“comprehensive alternative to the war system” (Renner, 
1998, p. 134). Any such undertaking, the proponents 
realized, required a fundamental transformation of 
how human collectives were presently organized. 
Conversion Studies, Peattie wrote, ought to critically 
“engage central institutional and intellectual arrange-
ments of our society” (1988, p. 12). 
Similarly, Senghaas contended that a conversion 
effort concerned with “destructive hardware” (i.e. 
weapons) alone would be short-sighted (1974, p. 71). 
Any transition from a war economy to a peace economy 
needed to be “characterized by more than the  
(momentary) absence of war and war-related produc-
tion” (Renner, 1988, p, 129). Senghaas called, more 
broadly, for a transformation of the entire “political, 
military and socio-economic context” that enabled 
any kind of armament in the first place (1974, p. 71). 
Reminiscent of Johan Galtung’s concepts of “struc-
tural violence” and “positive peace” (see Galtung, 
1969), Renner argued that the prime objective of con-
version was “the absence of fundamental social, eco-
nomic, political, and ecological conflicts”, a world free 
of “conflicts between nations, along ethnic, gender, 
and class lines, and between humans and their natu-
ral environment” (1988, p. 129). To achieve this noble 
goal, we ought to proactively work toward the transi-
tion to a “non-destructive, non-alienating, democrati-
cally-structured, and environmentally benign economy” 
(p. 138). 
With this in mind, Brzoska distinguished what he 
called “qualitative” and “military–political” conver-
sion from “quantitative” and “economic” conversion 
(1999b, p. 29). Of course, both objectives are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive (see Dumas, 1988, p. 7).  
Nevertheless, the former tends to considerably  
expand the agenda of Conversion Studies. Dieter 
Senghaas held that conversion efforts, even if nar-
rowly conceived in economic terms only, needed to 
be “synchronized” with a range of additional, more 
encompassing political aims. In the final assessment, 
conversion ought to be guided by a desire for human 
“emancipation” (1974, p. 72).  
Writings in Conversion Studies during the Cold 
War differed in whether they located this ambitious 
goal primarily on either a micro- or more macroscopic 
scale. Numerous scholars, including Melman, envi-
sioned converted industry plants characterized by 
humane working conditions, workers’ participation 
in operative business decisions, considerations of 
ecological concerns and, most importantly, the pro-
duction of “socially useful” objects (see Breitschwerdt, 
1988/89, p. 12; Birckenbach, 1991, p. 5, Renner, 1992,  
p. 36; Bischak & Yudken 1993, pp. 167–68). A much- 
discussed model was the so-called Lucas Plan, devel-
oped in 1976 by workers at the defence company  
Lucas Aerospace in Great Britain (see Elliot, 1977; 
Smith, 2014). Although never put into action and rarely 
copied elsewhere, many hoped that democratically, 
bottom-up initiated conversion projects in small-
scale working environments could lay the foundation 
for a “new kind of social, cultural and political coex-
istence” (Wulf et al., 1987, p. 281).  
Novel modes of coexistence could be equally  
imagined on an international or global scale. As an 
example for “qualitative” conversion, Brzoska alluded 
to a shift from offensive to defensive military doctrines, 
in turn requiring a certain restructuring and, in all 
likelihood, downsizing of forces (1999b, p. 29). Conver-
sion would be less a matter of promoting economic 
growth and/or improving the quality of working con-
ditions; it would be a “strategy for international 
peacebuilding” (see Southwood 1997, p. 103). Ultimately, 
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“Swords to ploughshares”—today, this biblical theme 
is no mere dream but a justified hope for many people. 
With the end of the Cold War, we may assume [...] 
that it will be possible in future to use more sensibly 
the finance that has been wasted on weapons and  
armies in the past... to fight starvation, sickness and 
need, to safeguard the natural basic of life. Conversion—
originally a concept by experts for experts—might 
well become a keyword of the decade (p. XXIII).   
Echoing many of the more radical voices in  
Conversion Studies, he went on to suggest that the 
“unwritten agenda” of conversion was 
“nothing less than the global implementation of the 
human right to an existence in peace and liberty, the 
human right to a life free of hunger and the human 
right to a clean and non-poisoned environment”  
(p. XXVII). 
The spirit of the days and the high hopes associ-
ated with expected disarmament also found their 
way into academic definitions of conversion, for  
instance as the “realignment of national priorities to 
reflect the lowered defence needs of a new era in  
international relations and to address important  
domestic needs” (Bischak & Yudken, 1993, p. 167). 
However, although the time may have been ripe for 
conversion, it was less so for the scholarly field of 
Conversion Studies. This held, in particular, for the 
more political—as opposed to technical—approaches 
to the subject. For at the same time that a utopia was 
preparing itself to become reality, many of the theories, 
which had been hotly debated only a couple of years 
earlier, had become irrelevant. The question as to 
whether conversion necessitated an overcoming of 
the capitalist system lost much of its appeal as many 
were celebrating the triumph of free markets, even 
pondering the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). 
More significantly, the end of superpower confronta-
tion could not be explained by the once popular  
assumption that the vested economic interests of the 
MIC had been the principal drivers of the arms race 
(see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, pp. 18–19; Birckenbach, 
1991, p. 6). Conversion could no longer claim to repre-
sent the most viable strategy for initiating a process 
of disarmament.   
As the Cold War came to an end and the member 
states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact began to significantly 
reduce military spending and cut the size of their 
armed forces, the grand visions of both liberal and 
many radical conversion scholars seemed close at 
hand. While some commentators remained sceptical 
and pointed out that conversion had so far been “un-
blemished by success” (Adelman & Augustine, 1992,  
p. 26), euphoria initially prevailed. All of a sudden, 
Conversion Studies faced a widespread and very con-
crete political demand for practical advice on trans-
forming military and defence resources. “Disarma-
ment”, Adam Roberts wrote in 1991, “is no longer a 
distant vision, safely confined to a utopian future, but 
a reality” (p. 71). An annotated bibliography of conver-
sion-related studies, compiled by Brzoska in 2000, 
shows a sharp rise in the number of publications over 
the first years of the 1990s. In 1991, Jonathan Feldman, 
Program Director at the newly established National 
Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarma-
ment in the United States, proposed a “comprehensive 
conversion and disarmament program” (p. 234) that 
would involve “several fundamental changes in the 
structure of political and economic decision-making 
and institutions”’ (pp. 229–30). One year later, the 
United Nations Commission on Science and Technology 
for Development, the German State of North Rhine- 
Westphalia and the Institute of Environmental Pro-
tection Policy (INFU) of the University of Dortmund 
organized a large ‘International Conference on  
Conversion’. One of the speakers at the event, Kofi  
Annan, at the time Assistant Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, claimed that the “world is looking 
forward [...] towards the establishment of a new system, 
perhaps of a new order, in which peace, co-operation 
and the rule of law will prevail” (Brunn et al.,1992,  
p. XXVIII). Conversion, the conference participants 
agreed, would pave the road to this goal. The North 
Rhine-Westphalian Minister of Higher Education 
and Research, Anke Brunn, demanded that while 
“[o]nly a few months ago, conversion [...] seemed to be 
a mere academic concept, a utopia”, it “must now  
become a reality, worldwide” (p. XX). Johannes Rau, 
then Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, sec-
onded her plea:
Conversion Studies after the Cold War and the 
establishment of BICC
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had called for a fundamental ‘societal conversion’, the 
far-reaching transformation of people’s hearts and 
minds. By restricting itself to material and physical 
objects, BICC certainly remained squarely in the 
well-established tradition of most conversion scholars. 
As for Brzoska, it ascribed to a “narrow concept”, 
which was “closely related to the quantitative side of 
disarmament” (1999b, p. 17). At the same time, BICC 
emphasized that conversion could refer to all  
“resources that become available for civilian use 
through reduced armaments, demobilization and  
demilitarization” (BICC, 1996, p. 18). This “resource- 
reuse” perspective (Brzoska 1999; 1999b, p. 17) was  
applied to altogether six possible types of convertible 
military resources: 1) the reallocation of public  
defence budgets; 2) the reorientation of military  
research and development; 3) the restructuring of the 
defence industry; 4) the demobilization of soldiers;  
5) military base closure and redevelopment; 6) the 
scrapping of surplus weapons (see Laurance et al., 1995). 
In each of these areas, BICC viewed conversion as 
“a process of managing the resources freed from the 
military sector for the greatest long-run benefit to  
society” (1996, p. 22). The faint resonance with previous 
debates concerning ‘social utility’ did imply a certain 
normative orientation, to be sure. Yet, the practical 
turn of BICC also signalled a departure from those 
earlier approaches that had perceived conversion as a 
pro-active political movement. As the Conversion 
Survey acknowledged, the concept has “been trans-
formed from a largely utopian project into a combi-
nation of practical problems and potential opportuni-
ties” (p. 16). BICC did not want to advocate “the full 
transfer of resources to civilian use”, for “thus far, 
complete conversion has rarely occurred”. Instead, 
conversion could always only be a “partial” process  
(p. 20). A possible synchronization of conversion  
efforts with other fields—after all, a central concern 
of many writings in the 1980s—was neither required 
nor was it thought to be particularly helpful: 
For practical reasons, the analysis of the dynamic  
aspects of conversion cannot be extended too far. The 
further one moves from the original resource transfers, 
the less insight can be gained from viewing such  
The coincident political demand for conversion 
and (partial) academic bankruptcy of Conversion 
Studies provides the contextual backdrop surrounding 
the establishment of the Bonn International Center 
for Conversion (BICC) in 1994—a direct consequence 
of the Dortmund conference two years earlier. Receiving 
its core funding from the State of North Rhine-West-
phalia and initially headed by Herbert Wulf, who had 
been much involved in conversion-related debates in 
the 1970s and 1980s, its mandate remained rather 
open, namely to use “applied science and research 
to deal with questions and problems arising from 
conversion”. Conversion itself, the document continued, 
“aims to reduce and/or prevent the preparation, threat 
or use of military or war-like violence in all its forms 
through the process of a comprehensive transfor-
mation”. Interestingly, this formulation suggested a 
decisively broad understanding of its subject that did 
not preclude a pro-active and political approach to 
the problem. The reference to a ‘comprehensive 
transformation’ even seemed to situate BICC on the 
more radical end of the conversion-continuum. This 
was not the direction that the institute would pursue, 
however. Instead, it was the additional remark that 
BICC ought to “optimize” conversion “in the practical 
implementation of disarmament” that contained a 
first clue as to where the institute would be heading 
(BICC Mandate/ Gesellschaftsvertrag, 1994, Section 2a). 
BICC published a detailed account of its “concept 
of conversion” in the first volume of the Conversion 
Survey in 1996. Notably, it refrained from articulating 
conversion within a larger theory that could have  
replaced—or adjusted—the outdated axioms con-
cerning the MIC. The disengagement from causal  
explanations for armament-dynamics allowed BICC 
to address conversion issues as they presented them-
selves across a wide spectrum of military resources. 
The MIC-perspective had prompted many earlier 
writings to focus on the defence industry (see Heine-
mann-Grüder, 2006, p. 20). Untroubled by any such 
predispositions, BICC regarded post-Cold War disar-
mament as “a multi-faceted process that releases var-
ious types of resources” (BICC, 1996, p. 22). This is not 
to say that it followed in the footsteps of those that 
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anticipated and hoped for. Three years before the 
founding of BICC, Hanne-Margret Birckenbach pub-
lished an almost prophetic paper arguing that post-
Cold War disarmament was largely a sham and most 
talk about conversion purely symbolic. Conversion 
Studies, she feared, was very much in danger of  
becoming “complicit” with a political discourse that 
loudly paraded peace, yet in reality sought to “re-  
legitimize” and “conserve” the military system (1991, 
p. 5). In doing so, it was about to strip itself of “difficult” 
theoretical baggage, not least due to its reliance on 
state funding:              
Wie alle anderen können auch die Konversionsfor-
scherInnen verstehbare Gründe dafür anführen, das 
Erkenntnisinteresse nicht allzu deutlich zu for-
mulieren. Sie liefen z.B. Gefahr, potentielle Geldgeber 
zu irritieren. Insofern gleichen sich Friedensforscher-
Innen und die militär- und rüstungsabhängig Bes-
chäftigten. Mittäterschaft verbindet […]. Erst wenn 
die KonversionsforscherInnen für sich selbst einen 
Ausweg finden und in der Lage sind, die Erkenntnis-
interessen zu benennen und trotzdem 
Forschungsmittel zu erhalten, werden sie in ihren ei-
genen Praxisbezügen glaubwürdig (p. 11) .2
In the 1990s, Conversion Studies would simply 
‘manage’ the smooth reduction of surplus weapons, 
soldiers and capital—avoiding the pertinent questions, 
much discussed by pro-active and political conversion 
scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, as to who defines this 
surplus and why (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, p. 19). 
What is the military for? How much military is needed? 
On which assumptions does any such claim rest? 
And how can these assumptions be deconstructed? 
The opportunity to seriously re-engage these questions 
at the end of the Cold War—which would have also 
necessitated critically revisiting some of the apparently 
flawed and one-dimensional theories of Conversion 
Studies—was clearly missed.  
2 \  Like all others, conversion scholars can give reasonable grounds for 
the fact that they do not specify their research interest too much. They 
would, for instance, risk to irritate potential donors. This is where pea-
ce researchers and those employed in the arms industry are alike. 
Complicity unites […]. Only when conversion scholars have found a 
way out for themselves and are able to name their research interests 
and still receive grants for their work will they become credible in 
their own practical relevance. (p. 11) (own translation).
processes as specific conversion problems. Conversion 
becomes indistinguishable from other issues, relin-
quishing its link to the original military resource use 
(p. 20).
In other words: Precisely because BICC lacked an 
overall theoretical framework that could have  
contextualized conversion vis-à-vis wider social  
phenomena, it needed to limit itself to addressing 
clearly identifiable problems as they presented them-
selves to policymakers. This focus on practicality also 
meant that conversion denoted more than transfor-
mations in only the defence industy. As the BICC- 
publication had it: “We do not advocate a specific  
approach to conversion but rather are guided by the 
search for the optimal use of resources freed by disar-
mament” (p. 16). 
Arguably, then, the concept of conversion pro-
posed by BICC in 1996 leant heavily toward the side  
of what was described earlier as the more technical and 
reactive or ‘problem-solving’ approach. In an article 
for the Journal of Peace Research, which was pub-
lished one year earlier, Julian Cooper had put it even 
more explicitly. To his mind, in the post-Cold War 
world, the “problematic of conversion requires its 
own conversion” (1995, p. 132). That is to say: “A con-
cept of conversion heavily freighted with ideological 
overtones is no longer appropriate” (p. 132). Conversion 
Studies ought to, instead, embrace the “new spirit of 
realism and pragmatism” and support the concrete 
“task of undertaking military downsizing with a min-
imum social cost” (p. 132). Already in 1992, Linda 
Forcey noticed that despite the skyrocketing number 
of publications concerned with practical conversion 
problems, a “major debate or discourse within the 
peace research community over ways in which a 
‘peace dividend’ should (1) be forthcoming and (2) be 
distributed [...] does not appear to be happening”  
(p. 215). This was also due to a certain degree of disap-
pointment among scholars. Although many states 
were indeed dismantling parts of their defence sector, 
the extent of disarmament was nowhere near the  
dimensions of what either the old ideologists in  
Conversion Studies or, for that matter, the keynote 
speakers at the Dortmund conference had 
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“post-conversion situation” and suspected “that in 
time the very word may fall into disuse” (1995, p. 131). 
And, indeed: “Perhaps the time has come to abandon 
the term altogether” (p. 132). Global levels of military 
expenditure began to consistently rise again by 1997. 
Conversion’s short-lived day in the sun was over  
almost as quickly as its sudden dawn in 1991 and 1992. 
BICC, however, remained. Taking stock of post-
Cold War conversion, researchers at the Center 
showed a somewhat mixed track record toward the 
end of the decade (see Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, p. 21). 
Brzoska acknowledged that industrial conversion had 
not provided the degree of economic stimulus 
expected by Melman (2000, p. 140). Discussions of 
“socially useful goods” and increased worker partici-
pation in decision-making had hardly played a role 
(see p. 140). By the end of the decade, many workers 
who had previously been employed in defence corpo-
rations were still looking for a job (see Brzoska, 1999a, 
p. 137). However, Brzoska took issue with assessments 
according to which conversion had been a complete 
failure. As he noted
expectations were simplistic and overoptimistic and 
could only be frustrated. They took little or no account 
of the wider political and economic environment 
shaping the shift of resources from the military to 
the civilian sector, underestimated the cost and speed 
of adjustment and assumed shifts in political decision- 
making parallel to large-scale disarmament which 
would have to occur (1999a, p. 131).  
 At a closer look, the “balance sheet” was “not 
negative, nor even zero”. Indeed, “a good measure of 
transformation of resources has been achieved” (p. 
137). The success rates differed from region to region, 
with economically weak countries, especially in east-
ern Europe, facing the most difficulties. The “peace 
dividend”, meanwhile, did not go into increased social 
or development expenditures, as many had hoped, 
but into deficit reduction and the balancing of budgets 
(see Dedek, 1997; Krause, 2000, p. 18).
But with decreasing political demand for conver-
sion, what was to become of Conversion Studies in 
the 21st century? Or, even more poignantly: What 
about the future of BICC? Keith Krause discussed this 
By the mid-1990s, the euphoria—so palpable at 
the Dortmund conference—had largely waned.  
Delivering a paper to the Proceedings of the NATO 
Advanced Study Institute on Defence Conversion 
Strategies in 1995, Philip Gummet remarked that “[i]t 
is unclear where all this activity will lead” (1997, p. 40). 
Some pointed out that we could not expect conver-
sion to produce any immediate positive outcomes: 
“[D]isarmament resembles an investment process  
involving short to medium term costs to achieve 
long-run economic benefits in the form of greater 
output of civil goods and services” (Hartley, 1997, p. 92). 
Others conceded that “there are very substantial un-
certainties about the effects of military expenditure 
on the economy”, mainly due to “the lack of a good 
theory of economic growth and how military expend-
iture influences the determinants of the growth rate” 
(Smith, 1996, p. 357). Dumas, next to Melman a key  
figure from ‘old school’ Conversion Studies, still  
suspected a “classic case of a set of vested interests” 
behind the apparent failure of conversion to deliver 
tangible goods (1995, p. 5). In 1996, he felt that a tipping 
point had been reached and warned that there was a 
“danger of side-tracking the process of international 
demilitarization” (1996, p. 148). As he went on, conver-
sion scholars “must stop making excuses for our re-
luctance to move into the future” (p. 149), for—and 
still clinging to the hopeful spirit of the early decade:
These are times of truly historic significance. We are 
poised on the brink of a new era in international rela-
tions. What we do now will set the pattern for the 
next century, perhaps for the next millennium. Hu-
man beings have long dreamed of a more peaceful, 
less militarized world. Now we stand at the thresh-
old of that dream. Instead of anguishing over all the 
reasons why the dream might fail, it is up to us that 
it does not (p. 149). 
Now, twenty years later, it is safe to say that  
Dumas’ dream remained just that—a dream. Only 
one year after the founding of BICC, Cooper noted 
how the term conversion had lost its hold on political 
discourse. At the same time that Dumas was almost 
desperately trying to reinvigorate the vision of the 
Dortmund conference, he soberly diagnosed a 
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of dealing with disarmament after the Cold War  
warranted greater attention” (p. 21). Now, however, 
was the time to develop a more daring and political 
agenda, lest conversion—and Conversion Studies—
should become fully irrelevant. Krause suggested a 
concept of what he called “preventive conversion” for 
this purpose; that is:       
The pro-active development and timely implementa-
tion of conversion policies to prevent the escalation 
of protracted conflict relationships [...] into violence, 
to diminish or avoid the accumulation of excessive 
and destabilizing quantities of arms or the waste of 
economic and human resources, and to reduce the 
militarization of social, economic and political rela-
tions (within societies and between states) (p. 22). 
The thematic emphasis of “preventive conver-
sion” would remain on the “efficient reallocation of 
resources from military purposes to other ends”  
(p. 24). Importantly, however, Conversion Studies 
could directly intervene and partake in—highly polit-
ical—debates surrounding the prevention of violent 
conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction. When 
Krause published his text, these were certainly the 
up-and-coming themes high on the agenda of inter-
national policymakers. The time was ripe to re-fashion 
conversion as a “crucial element” of those broader 
peace- and security-building activities in many places 
in the world (and particularly the Global South) 
(see p. 24).   
At least from 2000 onwards, BICC reoriented itself 
very much in line with Krause’s proposal. With its 
new director Peter Croll, who was appointed in 2002 
and had previously worked in development coopera-
tion, the working focus shifted from a concern with 
the post-Cold War conversion of defence industries, 
military personnel, R&D, bases or capital in western 
and eastern Europe to applied research and policy  
advice on, among other things, demobilization on the 
Balkans, small arms control in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
‘security sector reform’ in Afghanistan and the reinte-
gration of former combatants following violent con-
flicts in Liberia, Sudan or the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. While BICC was certainly successful in  
securing third-party funding from various sources 
question in an article for a BICC brief in 2000. Reflecting 
upon the past decade, he effectively suggested a  
return to a more pro-active and re-politicized take on 
conversion. In the final analysis, the experiences of 
the 1990s had “call[ed] into question the basic idea of 
conversion” (p. 19). Not only had a degree of world-
wide disarmament been completed, but the actual 
importance of conversion to that very process was 
more than doubtful. In most cases, the defence indus-
try had restructured itself without relying on too 
much input from “conversion advocates” (p. 20). To 
the extent that conversion had been talked about at 
all, it was largely considered “a ‘clean-up’ process that 
follows the transformation of political-security rela-
tions as essentially a technical and managerial task”  
(p. 19). It was “turned—intentionally or not—into a 
[...] tool for dealing with the consequences of 
changed security relationships” (p. 21). Conversion 
would only be a relevant topic of political and schol-
arly discussion if there were an external demand for 
it. All the while, the older field of Conversion Studies 
seemed, at least at first sight, to have little immediate 
appeal to any future-oriented research agenda. If it 
was “inextricably linked to the Cold War problem of 
the military–industrial complex or to unjustifiably 
high levels of defence spending”, then it “cannot easily 
be transferred or adapted to new contexts” (p. 20).  
Given these challenges, Krause encouraged BICC 
to consider the “logic of the core concept of conversion” 
(2000, p. 21). For him, this implied, on the one hand, a 
“concern with the economic dimension of military 
expenditures and related activities” (p. 21). On the 
other hand, it meant to install “a focus on the poten-
tial of conversion activities to transform the role and 
weight of institutions of organized violence in social, 
political and economic life” (pp. 21–22). This latter  
observation was crucial. It served as a reminder that 
conversion was not simply a technical reaction to 
ready-made political decisions; instead, it “can play 
a role in the transformation of political-security  
relations themselves” (p. 19). As to most of BICC’s 
work during the 1990s, Krause noted that “the trans-
formative potential has been almost entirely left 
aside, perhaps simply because the practical problems 
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(mostly public) and published numerous studies 
dealing with issues of crisis prevention, ‘early warn-
ing, early action’ and post-conflict reconstruction, 
the idea of ‘preventive conversion’ got lost along the 
way, that is, it rarely served as an explicit reference 
point in any of BICC’s publications in the first decade 
of the new millennium. Somewhat more nuanced 
and encompassing theoretical reflections informing 
popular concepts such as peacebuilding or conflict 
transformation effectively overshadowed it (see 
Heinemann-Grüder, 2006, p. 24). Conceivably, also, the 
complexities underlying many of the so-called new 
wars did not allow for any easy and straightforward 
solutions and answers to which an updated concept 
of conversion could have normatively attached itself 
(as in the past, where the vested interests in the mili-
tary–industrial complex became posited as the root of 
all evil). As one critical commentator pointed out, 
BICC’s research was not as agenda-setting or trans-
formative as Krause had hoped for with his reconcep-
tualization of conversion (see Bayer, 2012). Just like its 
work in the 1990s, the reliance on funding from pub-
lic donors continued to put BICC into a position in 
which it largely responded to already made policy de-
cisions—rather than pro-actively contributing to the 
development of alternative policies.           
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Conversion Studies pro-actively  
advocates transformation processes 
bent upon reducing the potentials of 
organized violence for wider social 
benefits.    
The beginning of this Paper demonstrated that 
the term conversion immediately evokes a process of 
social—or spiritual—change from one state of existence 
to another. What Krause referred to as the transform-
ative potential of the concept applies equally to its 
original usage in Catholic dogma (‘faith conversion’) 
as it does to 20th-century Conversion Studies with its 
focus on reusing formerly military resources for civilian 
means. Any reference to conversion and Conversion 
Studies in the 21st century ought to stay clearly  
attached to this tradition. It makes no sense to speak 
of conversion without a reference to some change. 
The essence of studying conversion is to either advo-
cate or analyze a desired or actual process of social 
transformation. Not all conversion scholars actively 
called for change, to be sure. Particularly post-Cold 
War Conversion Studies—but also the first writings 
on converting military overcapacities following 
World War II merely reacted to changes already taking 
place (and quite irrespective of whether they had been 
demanded by academics or social movements). At 
times, these conversion efforts were very successful 
(as in the late 1940s), at others a rather more mixed 
picture emerged (as in the 1990s). Yet, and regardless 
of the outcome, once the transition had been com-
pleted, the need for conversion-related expertise 
quickly diminished. Hence, if Conversion Studies 
wants to be anything more than an occasional response 
to political demands for technical solutions, it ought 
to pro-actively advocate change itself—as did those 
either liberal or radical scholars during the Cold War.  
As it happens, in the year 2017, the world resem-
bles the Cold War period to the extent that nearly all 
of the major military powers are either implement-
ing or anticipating significant increases to their de-
fence budgets. Conversion Studies in the 21st century 
would have to be an explicitly normative science that 
In the new millennium, academic or, for that 
matter, any writings on conversion have been scarce, 
to say the least. Neither is there a major political  
demand (as in the 1940s or 1990s), nor does the  
concept appear to adequately address what is widely 
perceived as the main problematics of security and 
defence policy in the 21st century (as it did in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s). The final part of this Paper 
makes six propositions that might guide a more  
concrete understanding of what Conversion Studies 
could mean in the 21st century. The argument is not 
necessarily a call to revive a dead duck and restore 
the study of conversion to its former ‘glory’. It merely 
holds that if one wanted to do such a thing, then one 
would be well advised to take the propositions sug-
gested here into consideration. They are inspired in 
part by an acknowledgement of what Conversion 
Studies did in the past, particularly by the debates of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, the study of conversion today 
cannot simply copy and paste the past into the present. 
It has to adapt old theories to fit new realities, all the 
while critically reflecting upon outdated axioms and 
thereby noticeably advancing the field along norma-
tive, conceptual and empirical-analytical trajectories. 
As a final caveat, this exercise should not be mis-
taken as a proposal for a new, different or more specific 
research agenda for BICC. Parts of the Paper have  
considered the evolution of BICC since its founding 
in 1994. This attention was justified since BICC played 
an important part in the conversion debates of the 
1990s and remains today the only academic institute 
that carries the term conversion in its name (at least 
that I know of). The purpose of this Paper is not to 
make recommendations on how the Center should 
continue to develop in the future. Of course, parts of 
BICC’s future work might take aspects of Conversion 
Studies on board (and, in fact, BICC already does that 
in many regards). Importantly, however, Conversion 
Studies would appear as a larger sub-discipline within 
Peace and Conflict Research that runs through various 
institutes and crisscrosses scholarly communities of 
different methodological and normative inclinations.   
Conversion Studies today? Six propositions
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deems all organized violence an evil to be eradicated. 
Quite the contrary: Instead of simply assuming that 
disarmament is always somehow good, a conversion 
perspective requires us to spell out the expected  
(civilian) benefits it would entail at a particular time 
and place—which also includes weighing these bene-
fits against possible harms. Needless to say that these 
benefits and harms are again open to interpretation 
and debate. Still, any piece of writing in Conversion 
Studies would thereby distinguish itself by following 
a certain grammar, namely how changes in one area 
(reductions of organized violence) affect either posi-
tive or negative changes in another. 
Conversion Studies particularly  
emphasizes the economic conditions 
of organized violence
The question of how to organize violence, and 
what the either positive or negative outcomes of such 
an organization would be (or are), underlines many 
publications in Peace and Conflict Research. And 
even if such writings develop concrete recommenda-
tions for social change, there is no apparent need to 
re-label them as part of Conversion Studies. Designa-
tions such as peacebuilding or conflict transformation 
could be used with equally good reason—and they are. 
Moreover, the deeper issues this question raises argu-
ably constitute the defining core of IR (the interna-
tional organization of violence) and traditional political 
theory (the domestic organization of violence) more 
generally. Consider, for instance, the highly popular 
concept of ‘securitization’. It shows how certain 
speech acts represent social problems as existential 
threats and thereby justify exceptional—and usually 
violent—military actions (see Buzan et. al., 1998). 
Would a reverse process of ‘de-securitization’ already 
count as an instance of conversion? And what about 
those no less frequent proposals from numerous 
studies on ‘security governance’ and ‘security sector 
reform’, making recommendations for improving the 
regulation of military and police forces in accordance 
with widely shared principles of democratic account-
ability (‘good governance’)? 
critically analyses the status quo and, on this basis, 
identifies and proposes relevant social transforma-
tions against the prevailing political Zeitgeist, espe-
cially concerning the on-going build-up of military 
capacities in many places of the world. 
Generally speaking, it ought to work toward  
reducing the potentials for organized violence.  
Organized violence, in this understanding, refers to 
any collective social structure established for the  
express purpose of exercising direct, physical vio-
lence against human bodies. Militaries and adjacent  
defence industries—the core objects of traditional 
Conversion Studies—are the first such structures that 
come to mind. However, while the term organized  
violence certainly captures them, it also expands the 
possible focus to include police and paramilitary forces, 
private military and security companies or non-state 
armed groups such as militias, rebels or even ‘terrorist’ 
networks. The primary scale of Conversion Studies 
would no longer be national and/or local; rather, it 
would need to take into account how various scales 
become connected through transnational and 
trans-local networks, as they have, for instance, been 
theorized in the concept of “global security assemblages” 
(Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011).  
Just as in the past, there would be no need to 
agree on how much potentials for organized violence 
ought to be reduced. Whereas there is a likely consen-
sus regarding those ‘terrorist’ groups, things will 
probably get a lot more complicated when it comes to 
regular armed forces and, even more so, the police. 
The point here is not to prescribe a benchmark that 
everyone in Conversion Studies needs to abide by but 
to emphasize this question as an explicit topic of 
contention. A certain degree of organized violence 
may well be deemed necessary if we want the police 
to fight crime and, by extension, militaries to stop 
genocides and mass murder. It follows that the reduc-
tion of organized violence, depriving certain groups 
or institutions of their abilities to exercise violence 
effectively, is not per se a desirable outcome. Although 
some conversion scholars might push and argue for a 
pacifist agenda, Conversion Studies is not—and never 
has been—a pacifist science in the sense that it 
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and Conflict Research, described the micro-level eco-
nomic incentive structures guiding the behaviour of 
non-state armed groups in civil wars (see e.g. Kalyvas, 
2006; Schlichte, 2009; Chojnacki & Branović, 2007). 
One of the realizations underlying many of these  
approaches is that variations of organized violence 
connect different strategies of capital accumulation 
to contingent forms of political order (see Boemcken, 
2013a). Or, to put it in simpler terms, the political 
economy of organized violence matters, be it for  
understanding the behaviour of individual actors, 
the mobilization of groups, or the composition of  
entire social collectives. Second-generation research 
at BICC has even resuscitated the old discussions  
surrounding ‘vested economic interests’ in regular 
military forces (see e.g. Brömmelhörster & Paes, 2003; 
Grawert & Abul-Magd, 2016). In doing so, it has pro-
duced original findings and policy recommendations 
without falling into the trap of relying on overtly  
deterministic causal explanations.
In sum, a Conversion Studies of the 21st century 
would be well advised to remain faithful to its roots 
and install its analytical focus on the political economy 
of organized violence. To delimit Conversion Studies 
in this way not only has the advantage of further 
specifying its distinctive contribution vis-à-vis other—
and just as relevant—approaches to the subject. As 
suggested earlier, Conversion Studies also pushes 
normative objectives of social transformation, high-
lighting benefits resulting from reductions in the  
potentials of organized violence. Hence, the broader 
the scope of analyses, the broader and more encom-
passing the conversion process it advocates. By framing 
Conversion Studies as, first and foremost, a narrow-
concern with the material resources and political 
economy of organized violence, it is less likely to  
become a project pursuing a comprehensive and 
far-reaching agenda of ‘social engineering’, of con-
verting peoples’ hearts and minds—a valid criticism 
that applies to the more radical approaches of the 
1980s as much as it does to many current efforts in 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation (see e.g. 
Duffield & Waddell, 2006; Pupavac, 2005).    
If it wants to delineate a fairly concrete and spe-
cific field of inquiry within the broader context of 
Peace and Conflict Research, Conversion Studies 
needs to be more than a large container for accom-
modating any normative approach to changes in the 
organization of violence. Looking back at the history 
of the discipline, and especially to the influential 
work of Melman, it is clear that the primary focus of 
the more pro-active and politico-normative scholars 
was on economic causes and effects of militarization 
(itself understood as mainly an economic process of 
resource allocation). As argued, this goes some way in 
explaining why Conversion Studies gradually went 
out of style. For example, the much-debated question 
concerning the relationship between military  
expenditure and capitalism—and whether defence 
conversion ought to go hand-in-hand with overcom-
ing the capitalist macro-structure—no longer seemed 
relevant once the only surviving economic system 
was taken for granted. And even the liberal positions 
put forward by Melman were somewhat overrun by 
the sudden end of the Cold War, which ‘vested inter-
ests’ in the American MIC obviously failed to prevent 
(as Melman had thought they would). Today, whoever 
talks of such a thing as a military–industrial-complex 
would immediately be suspected of leaning to con-
spiracy theories (and in most cases probably rightly so). 
With the benefit of hindsight, the central problem 
of Conversion Studies in the 1970s and 1980s consisted 
in a certain tendency to search for linear causalities 
(‘causes’, ‘effects’), in turn prompting an often very 
one-dimensional overemphasis on certain economic 
factors at the expense of appreciating the complexities 
warranted by a broader analytical perspective.  
Crucially, however, this does not already disqualify  
investigations into the political economy of organized 
violence. There is, indeed, a well-established body of 
literature in historical sociology that does precisely 
this. Already quite some time ago, scholars such as 
Charles Tilly (1992) or Michael Mann (1988) produced 
impressive, macroscopic accounts on how, not least, 
economic conditions informed modern state-building. 
Recent studies, more directly associated with Peace 
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attention in the future, it should not only remain 
concerned with normative social change and political 
economy, but also with manifestations of organized 
violence as they appear in comparatively affluent, 
highly industrialized and usually ‘peaceful’ societies. 
As conversion scholars of the past have forcefully  
argued over and over again, these present problems of 
themselves—and quite regardless of whether they 
lead to violent conflict or not. Organized violence  
already shows itself in any social structure that  
collects and invests resources for the purpose of  
acquiring the necessary capabilities to effectively  
exercise physical force. In purely quantitative terms, 
it is thus most immediately apparent in the Global 
North and parts of East Asia. US defence expenditure 
still constitutes, for example, almost half of all global 
investments into the military. By way of contrast, the 
resources devoted to establishing and maintaining 
structures of organized violence in those conflict- 
ridden and ‘fragile’ states of the South are compara-
tively minimal, even when considered in relation to 
the overall economic performance of these societies 
(see Boemcken, 2008).    
A quick scan of publications from Peace and  
Conflict Research in the new millennium, including 
studies on the political economy of violence, reveals a 
clear bias in favour of analyzing violent conflicts. 
There appears, then, to be a certain niche that  
Conversion Studies could occupy—and rightfully so, 
given the history of the discipline. The rationale 
would decidedly differ from the early 1990s, of course, 
where the world was caught up in a widespread pro-
cess of disarmament. In a way, present-day Conversion 
Studies would much more closely resemble the 1970s 
and 1980s. Indeed, global military spending has 
reached a level comparable to that of the Cold War. 
The myth according to which defence and security 
spending has a beneficial impact on the wider economy, 
spread by lobbyists from the arms industry and taken 
up in official documents of states, is once again gaining 
popularity (see Brzoska, 2013). For the time being, the 
European defence industry still has significant over- 
capacities (Mehrens & Wilke, 2009, p. 40). Yet, instead 
of instigating a renewed discussion of industrial 
Conversion Studies goes beyond an  
exclusive concern with protracted  
violent conflicts and mainly focuses on 
organized violence in ‘peaceful’ regions
The vast majority of academic writings on the  
political economy of organized violence concerns i 
tself squarely with protracted civil wars in the Global 
South. This is much in line with an overall shift in 
Peace and Conflict Research over the past two decades, 
which seems to have discovered those ‘new wars’ as 
its primary field of inquiry. At the same time, political 
discourses in Europe and North America have increas- 
ingly presented these conflicts in so-called fragile or 
failed states as ‘safe havens for terrorists’, hubs of 
transnational criminal networks, disruptions of global 
trade routes, catalysts of migration flows and thus 
threats to their own security. Research on such issues 
thus follows a certain political demand for developing 
recommendations on how these conflicts may be 
ended or, at least, contained. Krause’s original sugges-
tion for a concept of ‘preventive conversion’ was also 
intended to adapt Conversion Studies in such a way 
that it could tap into this prevailing trend.    
While certainly a worthy and relevant area of 
study, especially for Peace and Conflict Research, an 
argument can be made that contemporary Conver-
sion Studies should avoid the obvious temptation of 
all-too-readily joining into the chorus of what, in  
effect, has become ‘Conflict Research’ and remode-
ling conversion as, for instance, a synonym of 
‘post-conflict reconstruction’. For a start, Krause’s  
proposal for installing the term conversion as a popular 
pillar of research and action on violent conflicts did 
simply not work out. The legacy of Conversion Studies 
as a discipline concerned with somewhat different 
topics appears to have been too strong. The term 
could not easily be moved from addressing one theme, 
namely the possible reuse of Cold War military  
resources held by the major powers on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain, to another one (the civil wars of the 
South). This lesson needs to be taken seriously. Con-
version Studies was never primarily about violent 
conflicts. If it is to gain any wider and renewed 
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annual Global Militarization Index (GMI) already 
builds on former approaches in Conversion Studies 
by comparing levels of military expenditure in various 
countries to social spending on health or education. 
One pertinent issue concerns the modelling of sce-
narios outlining the expected wider consequences 
when either increasing or decreasing defence expen- 
ditures to any significant degree. Keith Hartley noted 
in 1997 that the “regional and local economic impacts 
of disarmament”, particularly on labour markets, are 
an “under-researched field” (1997, p. 96). This observa-
tion remains valid twenty years down the line. 
Whereas many economists continue to address a 
range of rather “esoteric problems” with little bearing 
on the actuality of collective social life, the “profession 
[allocates] relatively few of its [scholars] to study the 
theoretical, empirical and policy questions raised by” 
armament and disarmament (Hartley 1997, p. 979). 
What effects, for instance, would the dismantling of 
the overcapacities in the European defence industry 
have on employment levels? How do the qualifications 
of workers in the defence industry prepare them for 
finding jobs in civilian sectors? These are very perti-
nent and highly policy-relevant questions, which 
would make significant contributions to ongoing  
debates (see Boemcken, 2013b). 
Conversion Studies should not be left to econo-
mists alone, however. Social scientists ought to com-
plement their findings and ask how violence ought 
to be organized in any given society and how much 
resources would be necessary to this end (an issue 
somewhat neglected by earlier writings on conversion, 
see Cooper, 1995). This question, in turn, could greatly 
benefit from situated micro-level analyses of the  
actual networks that structure the political economy 
of organized violence in very concrete settings— 
examples include Hugh Gusterson’s study of the  
“securityscapes” of workers in the American defence 
industry (2004) or Didier Bigo’s “field analysis” of  
security professionals in Europe (2007; also Bigo & 
Jeandesboz, 2010). Although this and similar work 
partly resonates with past interests in ‘military–  
industrial-complexes’, it jumps to no hasty conclusions 
and is based on thorough empirical field research. 
conversion, these have so far only resulted in increased 
arms exports to states outside of NATO and the  
European Union (see Moltmann & Boemcken, 2012). 
Finally, and despite all the theoretical shortcomings, 
many of Melman’s observations regarding the ineffi-
ciency of the defence industry remain as accurate  
today as they were in the 1970s—just think of the 
many procurement scandals that regularly make the 
headlines. Conversion Studies can pose many of the 
same critical questions it did in the past—and the  
answers might not be that different in many cases 
(see Mehrens & Wilke, 2009).       
Conversion Studies bridges academic 
cultures
Conversion studies also has the potential to com-
bine largely distinct academic disciplines and cultures. 
On the one hand, it is an openly normative discipline: 
It is all about change and ‘making the world a better 
place’. In this sense, Conversion Studies clearly belongs 
to what has sometimes been labelled the soft and 
emancipatory agenda of peace studies, commonly  
associated with notions of ‘structural violence’,  
exploitation and class struggle, gender inequalities 
and racism. On the other hand, however, its more  
specific concern with military resources, such as  
defence spending, situates the discipline very close to 
the so-called hard and positivist approach of ‘peace 
science’, focusing on issues of arms control and arma-
ment. Linda Rennie Forcey observed that the history 
of Peace and Conflict Research—or rather: peace 
studies/ peace science—is very much a story of oppo-
sition between these two distinct strands (1992, p. 217). 
As she went on, Conversion Studies calls “both for the 
scientific, technological, quantitative skills of peace 
science, and for the normative, activist, future-oriented 
skills of peace studies” (p. 225). It is thus an “excellent 
meeting point at which the two cultures may come 
to appreciate their interconnectedness and appreciate 
their differences” (p. 216).
In the 21st century, the study of conversion could 
incorporate and combine both hard macroeconomic 
and softer micro-sociological approaches. BICC’s 
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intricate complexities driving social phenomena. A 
critical Conversion Studies would therefore—also—
have to be self-critical, that is reflect upon some of 
the shortcomings of the (critical) theories developed 
during the Cold War, which constitute a further reason 
underlying the irrelevance of the discipline today. 
Whoever attributes, for instance, current dynamics 
in armament and militarization singlehandedly to 
‘vested interests’ in ‘military–industrial-complexes’ 
will hardly be taken seriously. The same goes for 
those demanding a world without weapons and the 
complete abolishment of all armed forces. Research 
can only expect to have an impact if it can self- 
critically demonstrate its explanatory power to make 
a difference. And it is, in fact, quite understandable 
that the conversion scholars of the 1990s quickly  
relieved themselves of difficult theoretical and nor-
mative baggage, distinguishing a ‘utopian’ past from 
a present ‘reality’ in which practical responses to an 
already ongoing development promised to bring 
about more concrete changes than Conversion Studies 
had ever actually initiated beforehand.
This is not to say that criticality precludes policy 
relevance. To argue that Cold War Conversion Studies 
was critical but not policy relevant, whereas post-
Cold War Conversion Studies was policy relevant but 
not critical would be an assessment bordering on  
caricature. Think of the—very practical—deliberations 
of conversion scholars in the 1980s to conjoin the  
interests of workers in defence plants with those of 
popular social movements to build broad coalitions 
whose voices would be heard by those holding polit-
ical power. Or consider the critical assessments of  
researchers at BICC in the late 1990s on the success 
and failure of various conversion efforts. The point 
here, however, is that both old and new Conversion 
Studies rarely, if ever, brought criticality and policy 
relevance together—as two principles of research that 
communicate with each other on an equal footing. 
That is to say, Conversion Studies ought to be policy 
relevant precisely because it conducts (self-)critical 
research, not in spite of it.
Conversion Studies could build upon such findings by 
combining them with results from other disciplines 
for the purpose of formulating concrete ideas for so-
cial change, not—or not only—in areas of violent con-
flict but in those regions where by far the most re-
sources go into organized violence.
Conversion Studies is both critical and 
policy relevant
Criticality implies a perspective that is not con-
tent with simply accepting a given state of affairs, in 
this case the particular organization of violence at 
any given place or scale. This was certainly true for 
the more political conversion scholars of the Cold 
War period, who wanted to unmask the ostensibly 
false assumptions put forward by the warmongering 
ideologists of the arms race. Melman, for instance, 
explicitly positioned himself in the intellectual tradi-
tion of critical realism (see Melman 1974, pp. 146–57), 
perhaps most famously represented by Noam Chomsky 
(who, himself, heavily relied on Melman’s work in his 
analysis of war economies, see e.g. Chomsky, 2004). Of 
course, a critical academic perspective can come in 
many guises and mean different things (an ‘uncritical’ 
academic work is, arguably, not academic at all).  
Nevertheless, to understand Conversion Studies as a 
critical discipline is to set it apart from those clearly 
technical studies, which essentially regarded conver-
sion as what Southwood called a ‘mopping up’ exercise, 
executing rather than reflecting upon political deci-
sions and suggesting alternatives. As the earlier argu-
ment had it, the predominantly reactive stance of 
Conversion Studies in the 1990s partially accounts for 
the demise of the discipline as worldwide military 
expenditures increased again towards the end of  
the decade. By way of contrast, a critical approach to 
organized violence does not so much wait for things 
to happen but rather goes out and engages with 
things as they are. 
To be critical also means not to settle for overtly 
simplistic and one-dimensional causal explanations, 
thereby neglecting the multiplicity of factors and  
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paradoxical and impossible. Civility is always already 
perverted. The more we insist on a civil space of peace 
and harmony, the sharper and more pronounced the 
contours will spring into view that distinguish it 
from a dangerous and militarized borderlands (see 
e.g. Caygill, 1993). conversion could only be reasonably 
thought of as a transformation that actually collapses 
this distinction between the military and civil or, by 
extension, war and peace. Only, the question is 
whether such a process would be, indeed, desirable?
As it were, there is reason to believe that precisely 
such a conversion is currently taking place (if, in fact, 
the clear distinction between the two sides ever real-
ly existed, see Neocleous, 2010). For example, policy 
discourses are beginning to call the strict demarca-
tion between military and non-military security 
practices into question. Concepts such as ‘homeland 
security’ evoke a broad spectrum of risks that ought 
to be engaged in concerted efforts by both military 
and civilian agents (see Hayes 2009, pp. 72–73). Bigo 
observed an increasing “de-differentiation” of the 
“inside” and “outside” (2008), and Derek Gregory  
argued that contemporary wars can often no longer 
be spatially confined, and thus clearly distinguished 
from zones of peace (2011). 
For Conversion Studies, this blurring of boundaries 
is anything but a merely abstract and theoretical 
problem; it shows itself very concretely in what has 
always been the principal concern of the discipline: 
The defence industry. Already in the past, many con-
version scholars noted that modern weapons systems 
are increasingly made of dual-use components, 
which can be used in a military and a civilian context 
(see Altmann, 2000; also Roberts, 1991). Even more 
poignantly, many defence manufacturers no longer 
concentrate on the production of military weapons 
alone but seek to enter the growing civilian markets 
for security technologies (see Marti Sempere, 2011; 
Mawdsley, 2013). As early as 1999, Wally Struys charac-
terized the industry therefore as a “civilian–military 
complex” (1999, p. 40). Besides weapons, it develops, 
produces and sells, for example, sophisticated border 
control and surveillance technologies, often to civilian 
customers. Yet, if such ‘civilian’ products can cause 
Conversion Studies is always also 
post-Conversion Studies
Can, then, an argument be made for a renaissance 
of Conversion Studies? As demonstrated on the previ-
ous pages, it has a lot to commend it. Nevertheless, 
some critical comments are also in order. In particular, 
an argument can be made that Conversion Studies 
today ought to understand itself as ‘post-Conversion 
Studies’. Post-conversion is not meant here in the 
sense suggested in 1995 by Cooper, that is, as referring 
to a period ‘after’ conversion in which the concept 
has become more or less obsolete. Rather, post-con-
version draws attention to the need to question and 
self-critically reflect upon the basic parameters that 
render conversion an intelligible process. The begin-
ning of this Paper showed that all previous definitions 
of defence conversion relied on drawing a clear dis-
tinction between the military and the civilian sphere. 
This dichotomy, moreover, presented one side as bad 
and the other as good. In effect, previous writings in 
Conversion Studies conceptually and normatively  
opposed the civil to the military; both were regarded 
as distinct and unrelated conditions that endured in, 
by and for themselves. For this reason, the idea of 
conversion ultimately harbours an almost eschato-
logical fantasy of ‘overcoming’, which goes back to 
the theological origin of the concept. At the end of 
days, the military will give way to the civil. And even 
if conversion scholars conceded that this goal might 
be practically unattainable for the time being, it con-
tinued to linger in any thought and argument that 
presented the civilian sphere as the somehow better, 
more true and worthwhile, state of social existence. 
Yet, is it possible to imagine a civil condition 
without its military anti-thesis? Does not any identi-
fication of civility depend upon a simultaneous move 
of designating that which is uncivil? If this is the 
case, then Conversion Studies needs to acknowledge 
that the civil and the military do not exist in isolation 
from one another. On the contrary, they constitute a 
dialectical symbiosis. It follows that any conceptual-
ization of conversion relying on a clear- cut dichotomy 
between the two poles would be deeply flawed, if not 
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potentially just as much harm as military ones—and 
are often indistinguishable from them—then an un-
derstanding of conversion that relies on a civil–mili-
tary dichotomy can no longer serve as a useful guide 
for formulating normative objectives.       
Not least for this reason, the final part of this  
Paper proposed to conceptualize conversion in  
relation to organized violence. Unlike all former  
approaches and definitions, this avoids drawing a 
distinction between a military and civilian sphere. 
Organized violence should not be regarded as one 
side of a dichotomy that opposes it to something  
altogether different (‘peace’). There is nothing exter-
nal to it, organized violence is everywhere, neither  
essentially good nor bad. Conversion Studies thus 
ought to recognize that—while its potentials can  
certainly be reduced—organized violence itself  
cannot be overcome, but always only re-organized 
over and over again: It is in this sense post-Conver-
sion Studies (or perhaps also ‘Perversion Studies’ ). A 
normative orientation toward social change ought to 
continually motivate conversion scholars, to be sure. 
Only, this orientation cannot be sought along a straight- 
forward and ready-made linear or even teleological 
trajectory. Instead, the precise normative agenda of 
conversion needs to be continually contested.     
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The Paper set out to chart the evolution of Con-
version Studies from the Cold War to the post-Cold 
War period. It then discussed some of the reasons  
explaining the demise of the discipline in the new 
millennium. Based on a consideration of the strengths 
and weaknesses of Conversion Studies in the past, the 
final part made some suggestions on how conversion 
could inform a systematic field of academic inquiry 
in the 21st century. The propositions put forward to 
this end lean toward a comparatively conservative  
approach that pays close attention to the historical 
legacy of conversion as a concept. In sum, Conversion 
Studies should be a multi-disciplinary, critical and 
policy-relevant field of research that advocates social 
change based on analyses of political economies of 
violence, particularly in the affluent, industrialized 
and comparatively peaceful societies of the Global 
North. At the same time, it ought to abandon its past 
reliance on a simple civil–military dichotomy and, 
instead, engage with the more complex issues raised 
by a focus on organized violence. This includes a  
continual questioning and readjustment of one’s  
normative coordinates.       
In the contemporary world, an increasing 
amount of resources is directed into the organization 
of violence. It goes without question that this trend 
needs to be accompanied by critical scholarship.  
Given the potential of Conversion Studies to conjoin 
otherwise distinct scientific approaches and traditions, 
a possible revival of the discipline might be worth 
discussing. Yet, and although the Paper concluded by 
identifying some relevant topics, which deserve closer 
attention in Peace and Conflict Research, there is no 
compelling reason to assemble, say, all critical analyses 
of the European defence industry under the heading 
of Conversion Studies—even if they come up with 
concrete recommendations for resource re-use and 
social change. Quite possibly, the patient is beyond all 
help. Nevertheless, this does not make the need for 
more and systematic research on these and similar 
issues less relevant. Regardless of whether a future 
field for studying the political economies of organized 
violence in a pro-active, critical and policy-relevant 
manner explicitly evokes the term conversion or not, 
it can arguably learn a lot from the looking back into 
the past of Conversion Studies.
Conclusion
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